Smith, M. E.

AM 1934
smi
c.1

Boston University
College of Liberal Arts
Library

THE GIFT OF the Author

378.744
BO
AM 1934
Smi
c.1

52117

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

Thesis

THE DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY

by

Mildred Evelyn Smith
(A.B. Wellesley College 1907)

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1934

52117

Page

a. LaFollette, January 1911 - February 1912

b. Roosevelt, February 1912

3. Effort to gain control of the Republican Party

Chapter III. Presidential election of 1912 55-67

1. Republican Party

a. Struggle between reactionary and progressive elements in national convention.

(1) Contested seats

(2) Choice of candidates

(3) Triumph of reactionary spirit

(4) Withdrawal of Roosevelt delegates

b. Failure to preserve party unity

2. Progressive Party

a. First Progressive National Convention, August 1912

(1) Nomination of Roosevelt

(2) Platform: measures of social and industrial justice

b. Spirit of the campaign - that of Crusaders

3. Democratic Party

a. Struggle between reactionary and progressive elements in national convention.

b. Triumph of progressive spirit in

(1) Choice of candidate - Woodrow Wilson

Page

Page

(2) Party Platform

(3) Preservation of party unity

c. Control of House, Senate and presidency

d. Analysis of election returns

Chapter IV. Democratic rule 1913 - 1915 68-70

1. Control of legislature and executive departments.

2. Progressive character of the legislation

a. Fulfilment of campaign promises

b. Changes in

(1) Tariff and taxation

(2) Currency and banking

(3) Control of trusts

Chapter V. The Forward Movement in the Republican Party 1913 - 1915 71

1. Conference of party leaders, May 1913

2. Meeting of the National Committee, December 1913

a. Reconstruction of national convention machinery

b. Reduction of excessive representation of southern states.

3. Conciliatory attitude towards Progressives

Chapter VI. The Progressive Party 1913 - 1915 72-88

1. Effort to build up the party

2. Roosevelt's apparent indifference

3. Dissensions within the party

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2014

https://archive.org/details/thedevelopmentde00smit

Page

a. Conference of leaders in Chicago

b. Retention of Mr. George Perkins as Chairman

c. Lack of co-operation among Progressives in Congress

4. Proposed amalgamation with the Republican Party - the "Hinman deal."

Chapter VII. Mid term Congressional elections 1914 89-92

1. Slight victory of the Democrats

2. Campaign of the Progressives

a. Reduction in popular vote

b. Reduction in House of Representatives

c. California - their only state victory

d. Doom of the Progressive Party

e. Conference at Chicago

Chapter VIII. Outbreak of the World War 1914 93-110

1. Need of preparedness

a. President Wilson's attitude

b. Roosevelt's attitude: effect upon his candidacy in 1916

2. Foreign policies an issue of election of 1916

3. Submerging of domestic issues - fading out of the Progressive Party

Chapter IX. Presidential election of 1916 111-125

1. Republican Party

Page

a. Conference of leaders
in Chicago

b. Retention of Mr. George
Perkins as Chairman

c. Lack of co-operation among
Progressives in Congress

4. Proposed amalgamation with the
Republican Party - the "Hinman deal."

Chapter VII. Mid term Congressional elections 1914 89-92

1. Slight victory of the Democrats

2. Campaign of the Progressives

a. Reduction in popular vote

b. Reduction in House of Rep-
resentatives

c. California - their only
state victory

d. Doom of the Progressive
Party

e. Conference at Chicago

Chapter VIII. Outbreak of the World War 1914 93-110

1. Need of preparedness

a. President Wilson's atti-
tude

b. Roosevelt's attitude:
effect upon his candidacy
in 1916

2. Foreign policies an issue of election
of 1916

3. Submerging of domestic issues - fading
out of the Progressive Party

Chapter IX. Presidential election of 1916 111-128

1. Republican Party

Page

a. Candidate

(1) Futile effort to nominate Roosevelt

(2) Choice of Charles Evans Hughes

b. Platform

(1) Criticism of President Wilson's foreign policy towards

(a) Mexico

(b) Germany

(2) Preparedness issue

2. Progressive Party

a. Roosevelt's declination of candidacy

b. Roosevelt's endorsement of Hughes

c. Attitude of Progressives in supporting Hughes

(1) Many not reconciled to Republican Party

(2) Support of President Wilson because of

(a) Progressive legislation

(b) Foreign policy

d. Hughes' failure to carry California

3. Democratic Party

a. Record of progressive achievements

b. Platform - similarity to Progressive platform of 1912

c. Foreign policy an issue.

a. Candidate

(1) Futile effort to nomin-
ate Roosevelt

(2) Choice of Charles Evans
Hughes

b. Platform

(1) Criticism of President
Wilson's foreign policy
towards
(a) Mexico

(b) Germany

(2) Preparedness issue

2. Progressive Party

a. Roosevelt's declination of
candidacy

b. Roosevelt's endorsement of
Hughes

c. Attitude of Progressives in
supporting Hughes

(1) Many not reconciled to
Republican Party

(2) Support of President Wilson
because of

(a) Progressive legislation

(b) Foreign policy

d. Hughes' failure to carry Californ-
ia

3. Democratic Party

a. Record of progressive achievements

b. Platform - similarity to Progress-
ive platform of 1912

c. Foreign policy an issue.

Page

Chapter X. Reasons for the disappearance of the Progressives as a party 126-131

1. Roosevelt's leadership

a. Abandonment of the party

b. His leadership no longer desired

2. Political traditions - two parties only

3. Interest of average man in means of livelihood - not in social and industrial justice

4. Slight appeal to materialists

5. Platform too advanced for average man

6. Not many practical politicians

7. Opposition of old political organizations

8. Opposition of Socialists

9. Fear of radical control

a. Appeal to cranks

b. Suspicion of such policies as

(1) initiative, referendum

(2) Recall of judicial decisions

10. Progressive tendencies of Democratic Party

11. Effect of World War

Chapter XI. Conclusion: Estimate of the results of Progressive Party 132-133

1. Temporary

2. Permanent

Page

Chapter X. Reasons for the disappearance of the Progressives as a party 126-131

1. Roosevelt's leadership

a. Abandonment of the party

b. His leadership no longer desired

2. Political traditions - two parties only

3. Interest of average man in means of livelihood - not in social and industrial justice

4. Slight appeal to materialists

5. Platform too advanced for average man

6. Not many practical politicians

7. Opposition of old political organizations

8. Opposition of Socialists

9. Fear of radical control

a. Appeal to cranks

b. Suspicion of such policies as

(1) initiative, referendum

(2) Recall of judicial decisions

10. Progressive tendencies of Democratic Party

11. Effect of World War

Chapter XI. Conclusion: Estimate of the results of Progressive Party 132-139

1. Temporary

2. Permanent

Chapter III

On June 18th the Republican Convention, composed of one thousand seventy-eight delegates, met at Chicago: of these five hundred and forty were necessary to a choice of a presidential candidate. It was evident that the contest between President Taft and Roosevelt would be a very close one, really depending upon who won the two hundred forty-eight contested seats, for neither had a majority without them. The Republican National Committee, which had been chosen by the Convention of 1908 was controlled by Senator Penrose of Pennsylvania and Senator Murray Crane of Massachusetts. Under the leadership of these reactionaries, sufficient Taft delegates were seated temporarily and allowed to vote on the contested delegations, to give Taft a majority and hence the candidacy. The Roosevelt delegation amid scenes of wildest pandemonium tried again and again to stop the "steam roller" tactics but it was impossible to break through the iron rule of the chairman, Elihu Root, once the old associate and friend of Roosevelt's. The party machine had triumphed in the nomination of Taft but in so doing they had destroyed party unity. Most of the Roosevelt delegates, at his suggestion, had refrained from voting or participating in the proceedings of the Convention. When the roll call was ended, the vote stood as follows: Taft 561, Roosevelt 107, LaFollette 41, Cummins 17, Hughes 2, present and not voting 349. Taft thus received but 21 votes more than were necessary for nomination.

In analyzing this vote various deductions have been made. Roosevelt in an editorial entitled "Thou Shalt Not Steal" in the Outlook of July 12th 1913 claims that Taft's scant majority of twenty-one was fraudulent and so "all claim to an honest majority disappears." LaFollette, on the other hand, was certain that Roosevelt could not claim a majority either. The Roosevelt members of the Committee challenged but seventy-two of those delegates reputed to be Taft's. Now if all of these were given to Roosevelt it would not even then have assured him the nomination. The truth of the matter was that the methods pursued in 1912 were no different from those used in 1908, but the bitterness of the struggle made them seem more obnoxious.

When Colonel Roosevelt in his headquarters at the Congress Hotel, realized that his cause was lost, through fraud, as he believed, he paced the floor, meditating his next move. Mr. George Perkins and Mr. Frank Munsey were talking in rapid whispers in one corner, then both advanced towards Roosevelt, each placing a hand on one of his shoulders said, "Colonel, we will see you through", while Munsey added, in tense tones, "My fortune, my magazine and my newspapers are with you."[1] That, to Amos Pinchot who witnessed the scene, was to mark the birth of the Progressive Party. The next step was to hold a meeting of all the Roosevelt followers, wherein a speech to the delegates, he advised them to return home and test the sentiment of their constituency and, if they found it favorable, to meet at a later time to decide the advisability of creating a new party.

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 420

In analyzing this vote various deductions have been made. Roosevelt in an editorial entitled "Thou Shalt Not Steal" in the Outlook of July 13th 1912 claims that Taft's scant majority of twenty-one was fraudulent and so "all claim to an honest majority disappears." LaFollette, on the other hand, was certain that Roosevelt could not claim a majority either. The Roosevelt members of the Committee challenged but seventy-two of those delegates reported to be Taft's. Now if all of these were given to Roosevelt it would not even then have assured him the nomination. The truth of the matter was that the methods pursued in 1912 were no different from those used in 1908, but the bitterness of the struggle made them seem more obnoxious.

When Colonel Roosevelt in his headquarters at the Congress Hotel, realized that his cause was lost, through fraud, as he believed, he paced the floor, meditating his next move. Mr. George Perkins and Mr. Frank Munsey were talking in rapid whispers in one corner, then both advanced towards Roosevelt, each placing a hand on one of his shoulders said, "Colonel, we will see you through", while Munsey added, in tense tones, "My fortune, my magazine and my newspapers are with you." That, to Amos Pinchot who witnessed the scene, was to mark the birth of the Progressive Party. The next step was to hold a meeting of all the Roosevelt followers, wherein a speech to the delegates, he advised them to return home and test the sentiment of their constituency and, if they found it favorable, to meet at a later time to decide the advisability of creating a new party.

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 430

Before dispersing they set up a Committee, which on July 8th, issued a call to all progressively-inclined people of the United States to meet in convention on August 5th at Chicago for the first Progressive National Convention.

The call to a convention presented a challenge to many Republicans who admired Roosevelt greatly as to whether they should break their party ties completely. Many of them had hoped that the Republican party might be purged from within and become truly progressive under Roosevelt's leadership. To such the National Convention had been a bitter disappointment. Chief among these was Governor Hadley of Missouri, one of the seven governors who had urged Roosevelt to become a candidate. When he decided to stay with the Republican Party, some of the Progressives expressed their resentment, but Roosevelt said, "He will not be with us, but we must not blame him."[1] Senator Cummins who had with other insurgents made such a heroic fight on the Payne Aldrich Tariff declined to leave the Republican Party perhaps because of "what it had stood for in days gone by," and in response to Beveridge's plea replied, "I am profoundly convinced that it is easier to substitute a new leadership in the Republican Party, than to build up a new organization to such power as to enable it to influence legislation."[2]

Senator Beveridge likewise felt a deep attachment to the party of his youth and manhood. Yet he was also ardently devoted to Roosevelt, for whom he had campaigned intensively before the Convention. Disillusioned as he was in the Republican

1 Thayer, William Roscoe, Theodore Roosevelt, 373

2 Bowers, C.G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 446

Party, he felt the need of a new party which should build upon the principles of the old, yet withal be more progressive and more responsive to human needs. Yet if there was to be any degree of permanence, it must be built upon something more than the personal grievance of one individual. While Roosevelt's great popularity would give a new third party a great impetus, yet it would not last over other campaigns unless there were inherent, fundamental, vital principles. After conferring with the Progressive leaders - among them his intimate friends, Perkins and Munsey, he announced his willingness to join the new party if it would adopt a program of political and social reforms and if it would continue aggressively in the future though defeated that year. Upon receiving these assurances, he publicly announced his adherence to the Progressive Party and was selected as chairman of the Convention and its opening speaker.[1]

It was not to be expected that LaFollette would join the new party because of the personal issues involved but he did apparently try to weigh fairly its effect upon the progress of reform for which he had fought during over a quarter of a century. To him acceptance of Roosevelt's candidacy was based upon personal loyalty rather than upon clearly defined principles.[2] Roosevelt's evasion of tariff reform during his term as president and his failure to check the development of trusts condemned him in LaFollette's estimation as a worthy leader of the Progressive movement, however effectively he might preach civic

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 423-424

[2] LaFollette, Robert M., Autobiography, 644,617

righteousness. So he preferred to remain with the Republican Party.

The first Progressive National Convention met in Chicago on August 5th, consisting of two thousand delegates and a far greater number of interested spectators. It was an unusual gathering, marked by an unusual spirit of religious fervor and enthusiasm. To one who looked down upon that great sea of faces, there was evidence of an exaltation of spirit like that of Crusaders of old. Here were gathered men of standing in their various communities who had battled for years for purer politics, now rejoicing that their hopes were about to be realized. Social workers like Miss Jane Addams, and level-headed business men mingled with the few sentimentalists whom Roosevelt later referred to as the "lunatic fringe" and a few of the old time politicians who were in the new party for what they could get out of it.

Some of the delegations received great applause as they marched into the hall with their flying banners. California, following behind Hiram Johnson, proudly displayed theirs on which was written:

"I want to be a Bull Moose
And with the Bull Moose stand
With antlers on my forehead
And a big stick in my hand."

Oscar S. Straus, the great Jewish philanthropist, led the New York delegation down the aisle singing fervently,[1]

"Onward Christian soldiers!
Marching as to war."

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 425

The keynote of the convention was sounded by Senator Beveridge in an extraordinary speech, picturing in language well nigh faultless the ideals of social and economic justice which were to bring hope and happiness to the great mass of the American people. The appearance of Roosevelt was greeted with wildest enthusiasm. His address to the convention, which he called a "confession of faith", closed with the words which became a sort of battle cry through the campaign: "We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord."[1] He was nominated by acclamation, as was the candidate for the vice presidency - Governor Hiram Johnson of California.

The party name adopted was "Progressive." In addition to political changes, the platform presented a definite program of social and industrial justice, which seemed rather idealistic then, but has since been almost completely adopted and made into law by the Democratic Party, with the help of Roosevelt's own Progressives. It recommended the direct primary; popular election of United States senators: the initiative, referendum and recall, including the recall of judicial decisions; woman suffrage; registration of lobbyists, and great publicity of campaign funds. It favored strengthening the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and denounced the Payne-Aldrich tariff. It urged the need of laws regarding child labor, minimum wage, industrial health and accidents and social insurance.

Many similar measures were to be found in the platform of the Democratic Party which had been adopted a few weeks before

[1] Bishop, Joseph B., Theodore Roosevelt, II:336

The keynote of the convention was sounded by Senator Beveridge in an extraordinary speech, picturing in language well nigh Tamilless the ideals of social and economic justice which were to bring hope and happiness to the great mass of the American people. The appearance of Roosevelt was greeted with wildest enthusiasm. His address to the convention, which he called a "confession of faith", closed with the words which became a sort of battle cry through the campaign: "We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord." [1] He was nominated by acclamation, as was the candidate for the vice-presidency - Governor Hiram Johnson of California.

The party name adopted was "Progressive." In addition to political changes, the platform presented a definite program of social and industrial justice, which seemed rather idealistic then, but has since been almost completely adopted and made into law by the Democratic Party, with the help of Roosevelt's own Progressives. It recommended the direct primary; popular election of United States senators; the initiative, referendum and recall, including the recall of judicial decisions; woman suffrage; registration of lobbyists, and great publicity of campaign funds. It favored strengthening the Sherman Anti-Trust law, and denounced the Payne-Aldrich tariff. It urged the need of laws regarding child labor, minimum wage, industrial health and accidents and social insurance.

Many similar measures were to be found in the platform of the Democratic Party which had been adopted a few weeks before

[1] Bishop, Joseph B., Theodore Roosevelt, II:336

at their convention in Baltimore (June 25th). Reversing the usual procedure, the candidates were chosen before the platform was adopted. A real schism seemed almost inevitable between the conservative and liberal wings of the party, but through the leadership of William Jennings Bryan this was averted and the party was preserved intact. The candidates favored by the conservatives were Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio and Congressman Oscar Underwood of Alabama, chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means: - by the Progressives Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey. Speaker J.B. ("Champ") Clark of Missouri tried to keep in with both factions. Even before the balloting began, Bryan introduced a resolution which (1) reaffirmed the party's position as "the champion of popular government and equality before the law" and (2) declared against the nomination of any candidate representing, or under obligation to J.P. Morgan, T.F. Ryan, Augustus Belmont, or any of the "privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class."[1] Naturally this caused a great uproar, but the resolution was nevertheless overwhelmingly adopted.

The convention contained 1,092 delegates, and 728 votes were necessary to nominate. Bryan was opposed to Governor Harmon, believing him to be a friend of Wall Street. Assuming leadership of the Progressive forces, Bryan was determined that the Democrats should not get into the same difficulties that the Republicans were in. He cast his ballot at first for Speaker Clark as Nebraska had instructed her delegates to do. Speaker

[1] Democratic National Convention of 1912, Official Report of Proceedings, 129-138

Clark had a majority, but was far from having the required two-thirds majority, while Governor Wilson was more than one hundred votes behind. While the fourteenth ballot was being taken, Bryan startled the convention by announcing that he should transfer his vote from Clark to Wilson because the New York delegates were in the hands of Charles F. Murphy, leader of Tammany Hall, and Murphy had transferred his support from Harmon to Clark. He insisted that the Convention nominate someone entirely free from the taint of Tammany support. Gradually Wilson began to gain and was nominated on the forty-sixth ballot. Governor Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana was nominated for Vice-President.

Once more Bryan's influence was apparent in the platform adopted. It called for immediate downward revision of the tariff and new trust legislation which would make private monopoly impossible. It favored the revision of banking and currency laws, a single term for the president, and independence for the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government was established. Corporations should not be permitted to contribute to campaign funds.

Thus the Democratic Party emerged from its convention with a candidate whose progressive achievement was unquestioned, a platform advocating definite reforms, and a degree of unity and enthusiasm which augured well for its success at the polls in November.

The campaign which followed was probably as exciting as

any that had ever been experienced up to this time. Roosevelt swept across the country dramatizing himself as a crusader of civic righteousness. His bitter attacks upon President Taft alienated some of his former supporters while others were genuinely alarmed by that "ill-starred trio" - the initiative, referendum and recall of judicial decisions." It was feared that this would lead to a complete breakdown of constitutional government and Roosevelt was forced to spend most of his time defending them. Yet the general enthusiasm accorded him made it evident that the real struggle lay between him and the Progressive Democrat, Governor Wilson. That the campaign was well financed was apparent by the lavish expenditures during these months. Roosevelt was criticized for his associations with Big Business, especially Mr. Perkins, who was an official of the International Harvester Company and partner of J.P. Morgan and Company. But Roosevelt's defense was that Mr. Perkins was sincerely anxious to see the relations between business and government and labor and capital on a better basis, and was trying to help him accomplish this.

During the height of the campaign, Roosevelt was shot in Milwaukee by a half-crazed fanatic but the wound was not fatal. He remained quietly out of the campaign until the last few days before the election. Then he made one of the greatest speeches of his career at Madison Square Garden pledging his "life if need be for righteousness and for brotherhood and for the welfare of mankind."

any that had ever been experienced up to this time. Roosevelt swept across the country dramatizing himself as a crusader of civic righteousness. His bitter attacks upon President Taft alienated some of his former supporters while others were genuinely alarmed by that "ill-starred trio" - the initiative, referendum and recall of judicial decisions." It was feared that this would lead to a complete breakdown of constitutional government and Roosevelt was forced to spend most of his time defending them. Yet the general enthusiasm accorded him made it evident that the real struggle lay between him and the Progressive Democrat, Governor Wilson. That the campaign was well financed was apparent by the lavish expenditures during these months. Roosevelt was criticized for his associations with Big Business, especially Mr. Perkins, who was an official of the International Harvester Company and partner of J.P. Morgan and Company. But Roosevelt's defense was that Mr. Perkins was sincerely anxious to see the relations between business and government and labor and capital on a better basis, and was trying to help him accomplish this.

During the height of the campaign, Roosevelt was shot in Milwaukee by a half-crazed fanatic but the wound was not fatal. He remained quietly out of the campaign until the last few days before the election. Then he made one of the greatest speeches of his career at Madison Square Garden pleading his "title it need be for righteousness and for brotherhood and for the welfare of mankind."

Although the Progressive Party did not attain the success they had hoped for at the polls, they did, nevertheless, make a remarkable showing, considering the short time they had had for organizing. Most of the leaders and the rank and file expected that the new party had come to stay and that in another four years it would have attained even greater strength, just as the Republican Party had from 1856 to 1860. Roosevelt himself did not share the hopefulness of his followers.

The Republicans waged a comparatively quiet campaign, in which the President did not take a very active part. He did, however, defend the record of his administration and warned the country against the new and untried theories advanced by Roosevelt, asserting that the Progressive Party was a product of personal ambition and its platform a veritable "crazy quilt." President Taft himself was held in high esteem, but his political associates were to many people extremely undesirable. It apparently did not matter that the country had made a real advance toward progressive government under his administration. A postal savings and parcel post system had been instituted; a constitutional amendment for an income tax submitted to the states; and another for the direct election of senators passed by Congress; civil service expanded; and an eight hour law for government employees adopted. All of this apparently was obscured by the indignation over the Payne-Aldrich tariff. It was his misfortune to follow a most brilliant political leader so that his mild, gentle way made him seem in contrast prosy

Although the Progressive Party did not attain the success they had hoped for at the polls, they did, nevertheless, make a remarkable showing, considering the short time they had for organizing. Most of the leaders and the rank and file expected that the new party had come to stay and that in another four years it would have attained even greater strength, just as the Republican Party had from 1856 to 1860. Roosevelt himself did not share the hopefulness of his followers.

The Republicans waged a comparatively quiet campaign, in which the President did not take a very active part. He did, however, defend the record of his administration and warned the country against the new and untried theories advanced by Roosevelt, asserting that the Progressive Party was a product of personal ambition and its platform a veritable "crazy quilt." President Taft himself was held in high esteem, but his political associates were to many people extremely undesirable. It apparently did not matter that the country had made a real advance toward progressive government under his administration. A postal savings and parcel post system had been instituted; a constitutional amendment for an income tax submitted to the states; and another for the direct election of senators passed by Congress; civil service expanded; and an eight hour law for government employees adopted. All of this apparently was obscured by the indignation over the Payne-Aldrich tariff. It was his misfortune to follow a most brilliant political leader so that his mild, gentle way made him seem in contrast crazy

and dull, or as Root expressed it, "it was like a change from an auto to a cab!"

During September and October, Governor Wilson made extensive tours through the West, proving to be an excellent campaign speaker. With poise, self assurance and freedom from personal invective, he discussed the changed conditions of life in 1912. He challenged his political opponents saying, "You are willing to act for the people, but you are not willing to act through the people. Now we propose to act for ourselves." In regard to large corporations, he declared that he was for big business and against the trusts. "I take my stand absolutely where every Progressive ought to take his stand on the proposition that private monopoly is indefensible and intolerable and there will I fight my battle."[1] He attacked the Progressive Party because of its acceptance of monopoly; its leader because he differentiated between good and bad trusts. By the "New Freedom", private enterprise was to be liberated from the control of the trusts. The government was to be restored to the people by popular election of senators, the initiative, referendum and recall of administrative officers.

It was frequently predicted during the campaign that the Democrats would win a sweeping victory, and the outcome of the election justified this view. President Taft carried but two states, - Vermont and Utah, giving eight electoral votes. Roosevelt received a total of eighty-eight, from Pennsylvania, Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, Washington and a part of

[1] Wilson, Woodrow, The New Freedom, 69

California. Wilson carried all the remaining states, with a total of four hundred thirty-five votes, - the largest majority any candidate had ever received with the exception of Washington and Monroe. The popular vote for Wilson was 6,286,214, which was smaller than the Bryan vote of 1908 by 122,892; for Roosevelt 4,126,020; for Taft 3,483,922. The Democrats also retained control of the House of Representatives, having a majority of 291 out of 435 seats. Some of the Republican Old Guard, Speaker Cannon and William B. McKinley, manager of Taft's pre-convention campaign, were defeated. In the Senate, the Democrats had fifty, the Republicans forty-four, the Progressives one, (with one Alabama seat vacant.) The Democrats also elected twenty-one governors of the thirty-five states in which chief executives were being chosen: these included New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Nebraska.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Progressives lost the election of 1912, the victory nevertheless lay with progressivism, as embodied in the Democratic Party. The Republican leaders might have made their party the organization most responsive to the demands of the voters, but they refused to take warning by the election of 1910, or to interpret aright the signs of the times in 1912. The Progressives felt that they had gained a moral victory, and declared that their leader was really the choice of the Republican party, because of the large majority of his votes over Taft's. Thus they would prove that it was

the Taft faction rather than Roosevelt who split the party. They even prophesied that the Republican party would disappear and the Progressive would survive. Time was to prove, however, that the Progressive strength was not real party strength but simply a tribute of four millions of people to Roosevelt, because he was - Roosevelt -. Without his leadership the party was to dissolve almost as quickly as it had sprung into existence.

The foundations for a permanent political organization had not been laid, partly because the party depended upon one leader and partly because it takes the election of great numbers of men all over the country to make a party a success. Herein the Progressives failed, perhaps because there had been so little time for organization. In only a few places did they have local and county tickets; even the fight for Congress received inadequate attention, because all effort was centered on the presidency. They did elect nineteen Progressives to Congress, but the Republicans elected about one hundred. If the Progressive National Committee had seen to it that there was a candidate for Congress in every district, it would have increased party strength greatly.

Roosevelt returned to his home at Oyster Bay feeling that his public career was ended, for as he expressed his views, "When it is evident that a leader's day is past, the one service he can render is to step aside and leave the ground clear for the development of a successor. It seems to me that such is the case now as regards myself."[1]

[1] Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, II:355

Chapter IV

On March 4, 1913, the newly inaugurated President said, "This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster not the forces of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust ? Who dares to fail to try?"

Having called Congress to meet in special session on April 7th, he urged them in person to complete the work of making a new tariff as soon as possible. Congressman Underwood of Alabama, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, introduced a new bill at once, drawn up according to the Democratic platform of 1912. When the usual swarm of lobbyists appeared, the President issued such a sharp warning that they were quelled. With the Democratic control of the House, the bill was passed May 8th. In the Senate where the Democratic majority numbered only six there was a longer period of discussion, but the measure finally received the President's signature October 3rd.

The bill was an attempt to make it easier for the common man to maintain his family in comfort. Therefore rates were reduced on clothing, raw materials, agricultural products and entirely taken off some food stuffs. It was estimated that the customs receipts would fall off by $38,000,000. the first year, leaving a deficit of $68,790,000. To balance the budget a graduated income tax was included in the bill, having been

Chapter IV

made constitutional a short time before by the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment (February 25, 1913). The Underwood Tariff, unpopular with some industries, notably the sugar and wool, satisfied on the whole a popular demand and to some extent proved that American industry could stand on its own feet.

On June 23rd, while the tariff bill was still under discussion in the Senate, the President again addressed Congress, this time on the subject of currency legislation. The principles which he laid down emphasized the need of a more elastic currency, some means of mobilizing bank reserves, and public control of the banking system. Based upon extensive banking investigations which had already been made by experts in previous years, Senator Owen and Carter Glass, Chairman of the Senate and House Committees on Banking and Currency, drafted the Federal Reserve Bill. After extended discussion the House passed the measure on December 22nd with thirty-four Republicans, eleven Progressives and one Independent voting with the Democrats. It received favorable consideration in the Senate and was signed by the President before the expiration of the year 1913.

President Wilson, with unusual powers of leadership and unruffled tenacity of purpose, turned to the next tremendous undertaking, - the regulation of trusts. As a result of his recommendations, a Federal Trade Commission was established (September 26, 1914) which should supersede the Bureau of Corporations created in 1903. The five members were to prevent

the use of unfair methods by corporations which were subject to the anti-trust laws, and were empowered to issue an order requiring the cessation of any objectionable practises which were discovered. If the order was not obeyed, the Commission had recourse to the circuit court of appeals. They were also to investigate the management of large industrial corporations.

The Clayton Anti-Trust Act (October 15th 1914) prohibited many of the practises common to industrial enterprises, such as interlocking directorates and price discriminations to lessen competition. A most significant feature of this act is the recognition of the demands of organized labor. It sustains the view point of labor leaders by declaring that the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Injunctions are not to be granted in labor disputes unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury, and trials for contempt of court are to be by jury (except when the offense was committed in the presence of the court.) Strikes, picketing and boycotting are not violations of any federal law. Labor and agricultural organizations (not for profit) are declared not to be conspiracies in restraint of trade.

Such was the record of the first year and a half of President Wilson's administration. The progressive character of the legislation in fulfilment of the campaign promises tremendously increased the President's prestige. The full significance of his success was apparent in the mid term Congressional elections of 1914 when the Progressives found that he had "stolen most of their thunder" and left them no vulnerable point of attack.

the use of unfair methods by corporations which were subject to the anti-trust laws, and were empowered to issue an order requiring the cessation of any objectionable practices which were discovered. If the order was not obeyed, the Commission had recourse to the circuit court of appeals. They were also to investigate the management of large industrial corporations.

The Clayton Anti-Trust Act (October 15th 1914) prohibited many of the practices common to industrial enterprises, such as interlocking directorates and price discriminations to lessen competition. A most significant feature of this act is the recognition of the demands of organized labor. It sustains the view point of labor leaders by declaring that the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Injunctions are not to be granted in labor disputes unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury, and trials for contempt of court are to be by jury (except when the offense was committed in the presence of the court.) Strikes, picketing and boycotting are not violations of any federal law. Labor and agricultural organizations (not for profit) are declared not to be conspiracies in restraint of trade.

Such was the record of the first year and a half of President Wilson's administration. The progressive character of the legislation in fulfillment of the campaign promises tremendously increased the President's prestige. The full significance of his success was apparent in the mid term Congressional elections of 1914 when the Progressives found that he had "stolen most of their thunder" and left them no vulnerable point of attack.

Chapter V

With such a record of constructive achievement as the Democrats had made, it is not strange that the Republican Party began to consider how they might regain the esteem of progressive-minded people and win back the millions of votes whom they had lost. Some believed that only a complete reorganization of the party would be effectual, while even the most conservative admitted that large concessions would have to be made. At an informal conference of representatives from eleven states, held at Chicago May 11, 1913 recommendations were made to the National Committee that a special national convention be held to consider the advisability of changing the basis of representation in future conventions.

Accordingly the National Committee met in Washington December 16, 1913 and formulated a new plan of reapportionment of delegates whereby each state was to have four delegates at large, one from each Congressional district and one additional delegate from each district in which the Republican vote for presidential electors in 1908 was over 7,500. This revision would reduce the excessive representation of Southern States, but not commensurately with the actual voting strength of Republicans in those states.[1] Thus by this mild reconstruction of convention machinery, the Republican party made a gesture of conciliation to the Progressives. The Progressives did not seem greatly impressed, however, and declared that they intended to remain with the new party.

[1] Ogg, Frederic A., National Progress, 366

Chapter VI

The Progressive Party, in the meantime, encouraged by their remarkable success in polling more than four million votes began making aggressive efforts to strengthen their party organization. The National Committee instructed its secretary, Mr. Oscar Davis, to open offices in Washington, and furnish a special news service from there to the several hundred Progressive newspapers in various parts of the country. These were sufficient in number, both large and small, to maintain constant publicity. Local committees were at work making preparations to get Progressives into country and municipal offices, and everywhere there was an attitude of confidence in the future of the party and its probability of success in another election.

So absorbed were most of the leaders in their plans that they failed to perceive at first that Roosevelt was not really happy in the continued leadership of the party. Apparently disheartened, after the elections he had retired to Oyster Bay where he seemed to prefer to remain in seclusion. Aside from a few brilliant statesmen, journalists, and social workers, he found little in the party associations to appeal to him. Furthermore dissensions among the leaders, - always the curse of reform movements - were already beginning to appear.

The first evidence of this party strife appeared in the convention which was called to meet in Chicago in December (1913)

to consult with Roosevelt, but so sharp were the dissensions that it narrowly escaped ending in open rupture. Some of the leaders, especially Amos Pinchot, were planning to launch a movement there to drop Mr. George W. Perkins from his position as Chairman of the Executive Committee. Roosevelt was incensed and refused to discuss the matter with Pinchot. Although no action was taken at this time, the effort to remove Perkins continued unabated as long as the party existed.

After the Wilson administration brought suit against the International Harvester Company, Amos Pinchot renewed the fight by a letter to Senator Dixon, (Chairman of the Speakers' Bureau of the Progressive Party) demanding that Mr. Perkins give up his office. Roosevelt and Beveridge warmly defended the progressivism of Mr. Perkins, while other party leaders like Gifford Pinchot, Medill McCormick, Senator Dixon, Hiram Johnson, and Raymond Robins felt that his connection with the party was an actual detriment. The latter was convinced that a million working men never would join a party whose executive head was also the head of two corporations (International Harvester Company and United States Steel Corporation), the labor policy of which was anti-union. Strongly and vigorously did Beveridge convincingly vindicate Mr. Perkins. Because of the personal feelings of Roosevelt and Beveridge, Mr. Perkins continued to serve as Chairman of the National Executive Committee, but with increasing danger to party solidarity.[1]

The next rift in the leadership of the party was apparent

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Party, 438-441

among the Progressives who had been elected to the House of Representatives. The little group of nineteen had been joined by Victor Murdock, of Kansas, who had been elected as a Republican. He had served several terms in Congress and was a member of the Committee on Ways and Means, which would be responsible for drawing up the new tariff bill in the special session called by President Wilson.

Mr. Underwood, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, was already holding hearings on the tariff and making preparations to draw up the bill. Much of this work was done in secret. This same method had called forth complaints about the Payne Aldrich measure. What should be the attitude of the nineteen Progressives? Obviously their votes could not in any way affect the passage of the bill, consequently there remained but one way to register protest on its provisions. If instead of voting by the usual "Aye" or "No", each one should vote "Present", explaining as he did so, that he votes in this way because of the total lack of information as to why the rates fixed by the committee had been adopted, and because of the secrecy surrounding the making of the bill, it might make an effective protest which would arouse the country.

A meeting of the Progressives in the House was arranged, and it was explained to them how such a procedure on their part might impress upon the whole country the Progressive point of view. Senator Beveridge was present, and told in detail of the fight made by the insurgents in the Senate against the Payne-Aldrich Tariff. Now the opportunity was given them to register.

by this method of voting their protest against the Underwood Bill. But these suggestions were met with a veritable storm of protest. These Progressives were not going to be influenced by the dictation of "Bosses" or any such political practises: they intended to vote as free representatives of the people. Thus with no conception of party solidarity, they voted all three ways on the bill -, some for it, some against it, and one voted "Present."[1]

The National Committee (of the Progressive Party) made one more effort to make the group of Progressive Congressmen instrumental in centering the attention of the country upon the methods used in tariff making.

The usual procedure for a tariff measure through the House is as follows: For several days there is a period of general debate, when the members make speeches which are designed especially for "home consumption" among their constituency. After that the bill is taken up in the Committee of the Whole, where it is read line by line, under the five-minute rule. Each member of the Committee on Ways and Means has five minutes, if he so desires, on any point that is questioned. Any member of the House has the right to move an amendment, which gives him five minutes to discuss it. One member may then be given five minutes to oppose the amendment. When this time has been used, it is possible to obtain more time only by unanimous consent.

The second plan of the Progressive National Committee was to attack the Underwood Bill, under the five minute rule, with

[1] Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 410,411

the demand for information as to why rates had been fixed at the figures adopted by the committee. If this were kept up long enough, it would attract the attention of the House and the country at large. This, the Progressives hoped, would make it apparent that the rates were fixed arbitrarily or in accordance with statements made by some interested person.

The procedure to be followed was identical for each item that carried a duty. After the clerk read the first item, one of the Progressives was to move an amendment by which he would obtain the floor. Then he was to ask the committee member in charge of that particular schedule what information the committee had which led it to fix that particular rate. Mr. Murdock, the Progressive floor leader, began the attack when the item concerning boracic acid had been read, by asking for this information. (As a matter of fact, the rate had been reduced from three cents a pound in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff to three-quarters of a cent.) Representative Francis Harrison of New York who was in charge of this schedule was caught unawares, for a chemical expert had fixed this rate, and he could not very well be summoned to explain it. So Mr. Harrison had to spend his five minutes in "stalling."[1]

Mr. Murdock sat down with a smile of satisfaction and never asked the question again about any other item, nor did any other Progressive attempt to carry on the plan. After this, the National Committee made no further suggestions to the Progressive Congressmen, who went their own way, most of them to their

[1] Davis, O.K., Released for Publication, 413-416

[1] Davis, O.K., Released for Publication, 412-416

political graves in the next election. This total disregard for the importance of team work made it evident that the Progressive Party was doomed to early extinction. One of the Committee aptly described the situation, when he said, "Sheep respond to leadership but goats do not. A flock of sheep, called or frightened, will run all in a bunch. But under similar circumstances a flock of goats will run just about as many ways as there are goats."

An even greater threat to party unity was the persistent rumor that the Progressives were going to return to the Republican fold. Mr. Frank Munsey had broached the subject first to Beveridge shortly after the election of 1912, but was so quickly silenced that he dropped the matter temporarily. In February 1913, however, he wrote as follows:

"I am especially anxious that you should open up to a receptive view of this scheme and get busy with me in helping to bring it about. --- We have got to get together the people who think alike, have got to get them together as a fighting force to go into the field against our common enemy, the Democratic party.

"You have had years of experience in statesmanship and I have had years of experience in business. The business side of politics is a very important one. It takes money to organize and maintain a political organization and to maintain a fighting force in the field.

"There is no considerable money in the Progressive party,

save in the pockets of a very few, and the very few will not feel called upon to fight another campaign alone. We need the Republican voters and they need us. We need their money and they need our idealism."[1]

Beveridge, realizing how dangerous such views were to the future of the Progressive Party, wrote a spirited challenge in the Saturday Evening Post of June 28th 1913. He asked how it was possible for Progressives and Republicans to merge when a million Democrats voted the Progressive ticket and a million Republicans voted the Democratic ticket. 'How merge Cannon and LaFollette, Penrose and Cummins, Parker of Louisiana, and Harris of Georgia with Root of New York and Smoot of Utah? And what terms did those Progressives who hoped for union expect to get? And why should the Progressives adopt a defeated attitude since they had polled more votes than the Republicans? The new party was also doing more organization work than both the old parties combined. It was being built from the ground up. Over five thousand party clubs had been organized in 1913, and in 1914 they would nominate straight out Progressives for candidates for United States senators. Did Republicans and Democrats stand for the same thing? Absurd! They differed on trust regulation, on the initiative, referendum and recall, on the idea that labor was a commodity. And child labor, too. How could the Progressive party with this conception of nationalism as one of its basic principles, be merged with another party that denied that principle? Would the Republican party put a child-labor

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 441-442

save in the pockets of a very few, and the very few will not feel called upon to fight another campaign alone. We need the Republican voters and they need us. We need their money and they need our idealism."[1]

Beveridge, realizing how dangerous such views were to the future of the Progressive Party, wrote a spirited challenge in the Saturday Evening Post of June 28th 1913. He asked how it was possible for Progressives and Republicans to merge when a million Democrats voted the Progressive ticket and a million Republicans voted the Democratic ticket. 'How merge Cannon and LaFollette, Penrose and Gumming, Barker of Louisiana, and Harris of Georgia with Root of New York and Smoot of Utah? And what terms did those Progressives who hoped for union expect to get? And why should the Progressives adopt a defeated attitude since they had polled more votes than the Republicans? The new party was also doing more organization work than both the old parties combined. It was being built from the ground up. Over five thousand party clubs had been organized in 1912, and in 1914 they would nominate straight out Progressives for candidates for United States senators. Did Republicans and Democrats stand for the same things? Absurd! They differed on trust regulation, on the initiative, referendum and recall, on the idea that Labor was a commodity. And child Labor, too. How could the Progressive party with this conception of nationalism as one of its basic principles, be merged with another party that denied that principle? Would the Republican party put a child-labor

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 441-442

plank in its platform?'

A few days after this magazine article appeared Beveridge received a letter from Roosevelt expressing the hope that he would assist the Progressives in Maine in their campaign for the September elections, because of the 'real importance to the future of the Progressive party in New England.' Roosevelt himself had been travelling through the west and on his return had given an interview which the Republican newspapers interpreted to mean that he would consider bargaining with the Republicans for a return. Beveridge felt that he should have met this challenge with a positive denial. He asked the Colonel, therefore, before starting for Maine, for permission to deny publicly such an interpretation. Roosevelt wrote in reply: (September 12, 1913) "I have for a year and a half been explaining to the Republicans just how they can get together with us - that is, by adopting our platform in its entirety, by retiring their own leaders of the Root, Penrose, Barnes, Smoot variety - and then I am afraid we should have to insist upon their changing their name, not that to me personally names mean anything, but because they do mean so much to many people."[1]

Beveridge still felt, however, that Roosevelt himself should issue a positive denial, and wrote him to that effect. Roosevelt did issue a denial, (September 9, 1913) but it was far from satisfactory. Beveridge attacked the National Committee for its failure also to deny the rumors that Roosevelt wanted to go back to the Republican party and was planning to get

[1] Bowers, C.B., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 443-445

plank in its platform?'

A few days after this magazine article appeared Beveridge received a letter from Roosevelt expressing the hope that he would assist the Progressives in Maine in their campaign for the September elections, because of the 'real importance to the future of the Progressive party in New England.' Roosevelt himself had been travelling through the west and on his return had given an interview which the Republican newspapers interpreted to mean that he would consider bargaining with the Republicans for a return. Beveridge felt that he should have met this challenge with a positive denial. He asked the Colonel, therefore, before starting for Maine, for permission to deny publicly such an interpretation. Roosevelt wrote in reply: (September 12, 1913) "I have for a year and a half been explaining to the Republicans just how they can get together with us - that is, by adopting our platform in its entirety, by retiring their own leaders of the Root, Penrose, Barnes, Smoot variety - and then I am afraid we should have to insist upon their changing their name, not that to me personally names mean anything, but because they do mean so much to many people."[1]

Beveridge still felt, however, that Roosevelt himself should issue a positive denial, and wrote him to that effect. Roosevelt did issue a denial, (September 9, 1913) but it was far from satisfactory. Beveridge attacked the National Committee for its failure also to deny the rumors that Roosevelt wanted to go back to the Republican party and was planning to get

[1] Bowers, C.G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 442-449

the Republican nomination in 1916. He wrote them (September 10, 1913), "Our people hardly know that to think. The one thing we cannot and must not permit is any suspicion of our political and moral integrity, or that of our great leader." 'What did Ormsby McHarg mean by his Detroit statement that Roosevelt was really conservative at heart and would be the Republican nominee in 1916? Such comments from one associated with the Roosevelt fight in 1912 were destructive.'

Two months after Beveridge's complaint to the National Committee, the leaders of the Progressive party assembled for a conference in Indianapolis. When Beveridge asked them if they wished to merge with the Republicans, there was an emphatic shout of "No." There was not the slightest possibility of misunderstanding their position in this matter. The rumors, however, persisted, not without some basis of support. An organizer employed by the National Committee for work in South Dakota was telling the Progressives in that state that a merger with the Republicans would be all right.

Beveridge next turned to the National Chairman Perkins with protests and warnings of the difficulty of doing aggressive field work in organization while the very foundations of the party structure were being thus undermined. Here again he met with no satisfaction, for Perkins treated the matter jokingly. Beveridge then wrote Medill McCormick urging that the Chicago Tribune make it clear that "under no circumstances or conditions shall there by any merger, amalgamation or connection

of any kind with any other party whatever. The sincerity and integrity of the Progressive party was at stake."[1]

Throughout the year 1913 Beveridge was not only persistently combating this propaganda, but he was travelling extensively over the country, strengthening the party organization. He was everywhere in great demand as a speaker, and he responded as far as it was possible, for he was very much in earnest about the new party with its ideals of social and political reform. In January he addressed a Northwestern Progressive Conference in St. Paul, where he endeavored to show the Republicans that that party had finished its mission just as the Whig party had finished its mission when the Republican party was formed. A month later he delivered in Burlington, Vermont a speech described as "one of the greatest ever given on economics and the industrial situation in New England."[2] When Governor Hadley of Missouri gave up Progressivism, Beveridge replied in an address in Detroit. As a means of building up the Progressive party in the south, he delivered a masterly address at New Orleans covering the program of the Progressives on the tariff, the trusts, the initiative and referendum. In comparison with the strenuous activity of Beveridge throughout the year 1913, the silence of Roosevelt was the more conspicuous. Moreover Beveridge was engaged at the time in literary work, seeking to satisfy an ambition he had cherished since his early youth, of writing a life of Chief Justice Marshall. When, therefore, Perkins sought to send Beveridge to West Virginia, he finally rebelled. "Why

1 Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 445

2 Indianapolis Star, February 15, 1913

shouldn't Roosevelt go? It would be his last opportunity for a bugle blast before leaving for South America." Why not indeed? There was but one answer possible: - Roosevelt had lost interest in the party he had helped to create.

The year following the famous election of 1912 was, as we have seen, marked by dissensions within the Progressive party, lack of team work among its members in Congress, rumors of amalgamation with the Republican party and a silent indifference on the part of its great leader. More threatening still to the party was the remarkable success with which the Democrats were carrying out their policies, some of which were identical with parts of the Progressive platform. The tariff bill was such an improvement over former ones that even LaFollette had voted for it and the currency measure was advancing by satisfactory stages. President Wilson was proving himself a skilful and courageous party leader, and the Democrats were giving him loyal support. All this was making a favorable impression on the country.

In the fall of 1913 Roosevelt was preparing to sail for South America on a hunting and exploring expedition. The Progressives tendered him a farewell dinner where many expected he would take advantage of the opportunity to "sound a militant battle-cry to rally the wavering columns of the Progressives." Mr. Perkins wrote Beveridge that "the Colonel is going to speak in a very broad way at the dinner and I am heartily in favor of it."[1] Beveridge replied immediately, "I do not agree with you

[1] Bowers, C.G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 449

about the theme of the Colonel's speech. If ever there was a time when the whole situation demands from him a battle cry that will sound from ocean to ocean and which will reassure those who have rallied to his colors, that time is the present." But there was no battle cry and the Colonel sailed for South America, leaving the Progressive party to worry along as best it could during his absence from the country (October 4, 1913 - May 19, 1914.)

When Roosevelt returned from South America, still suffering from the effects of the illness which had nearly ended his life there, he was reluctant to resume the leadership of the Progressive party. He would have preferred to keep out of the campaign of 1914 completely but this scarcely seemed possible. In several of the states, the most prominent Progressive leaders were candidates for office. In Indiana, Beveridge was again a candidate for United States Senator, as was Johnson in California, and James R. Garfield in Ohio. Gifford Pinchot was waging a brilliant fight for the Senate against Penrose in Pennsylvania. In Kansas, Bristow was running for re-election on the Republican ticket, opposed by Victor Murdock, the Progressive nominee. The success of these prominent Progressive candidates would be a real index of the strength of the party and would inevitably have a real significance for its future. These men had been among the Colonel's most earnest supporters in 1912, and he felt that he owed them a debt of gratitude which could only be repaid by rendering to them similar assistance at this

time. He did, however, refuse the request of the party that he enter the race as candidate for governor of New York, for he had already decided to give his support to Mr. Harvey Hinman.

The Progressives who had made a good showing in New York state in the election of 1912 thought that they had a fair chance of success in 1914, especially since there had been an open rupture among the Democrats following the impeachment of their Governor Sulzer. The Republicans also were alert to the possibilities of the situation. Mr. Hinman was regarded as a Republican, but he had been a steady supporter of Roosevelt up to the split in 1912, and the Colonel believed he would make an excellent governor. So Roosevelt began to sound out Progressive opinion as to placing Hinman's name in the primaries as their candidate. Although this proposition was not very well received, it might have been carried out, had it not been doubtful whether Hinman could get the Republican nomination also. What would be his attitude if he won the Progressive but lost the Republican nomination? Would he go through the campaign as a Progressive or would he drop out of the race altogether? In order to ascertain this, Roosevelt sent the Secretary of the Progressive National Committee, Mr. Oscar K. Davis, to interview Mr. Hinman personally. The latter finally admitted that he would not run on the Progressive ticket, if the Republicans refused to place him in nomination in their primaries.[1] It was manifestly impossible then for Roosevelt to carry out his plan.

[1] Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 425

time. He did, however, refuse the request of the party that he enter the race as candidate for governor of New York, for he had already decided to give his support to Mr. Harvey Hinman.

The Progressives who had made a good showing in New York state in the election of 1912 thought that they had a fair chance of success in 1914, especially since there had been an open rupture among the Democrats following the impeachment of their Governor Sulzer. The Republicans also were alert to the possibilities of the situation. Mr. Hinman was regarded as a Republican, but he had been a steady supporter of Roosevelt up to the split in 1912, and the Colonel believed he would make an excellent governor. So Roosevelt began to sound out Progressive opinion as to placing Hinman's name in the primaries as their candidate. Although this proposition was not very well received, it might have been carried out, had it not been doubtful whether Hinman could get the Republican nomination also. What would be his attitude if he won the Progressive but lost the Republican nomination? Would he go through the campaign as a Progressive or would he drop out of the race altogether? In order to ascertain this, Roosevelt sent the Secretary of the Progressive National Committee, Mr. Oscar K. Davis, to interview Mr. Hinman personally. The latter finally admitted that he would not run on the Progressive ticket, if the Republicans refused to place him in nomination in their primaries. It was manifestly impossible then for Roosevelt to carry out his plan.

1

1 Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 425

When the news of these secret negotiations finally leaked out, the Progressives were astounded. For the founder and beloved leader of their party to place in nomination a candidate who was an avowed Republican, could have but the one meaning - Roosevelt was getting ready to leave his followers and return to the Republican party! The 'Hinman deal' was the first step in that direction. All these persistent rumors were not without foundation, then, - he had intended all along to go back. The argument that the reform forces of both Republicans and Progressives should unite against the political machines of these two parties was illogical since it did not include the Democrats at all. The Progressives who were in the party for personal advantage promptly deserted and hastened to join the Republicans again.

The Republicans of New York state haughtily dismissed Roosevelt's suggestion for a fusion candidate, and as a result he announced that "of course he would support the Progressive ticket." But the Progressives entered the campaign humiliated by such overtures to the Republican party. The Progressive State Convention finally nominated for governor, Frederick M. Davenport, who accepted on condition that Roosevelt should campaign the state for him. After giving this promise, Roosevelt toured the state with him, in an automobile, speaking at crossroads and country towns, and "working very much as if he were a candidate for township supervisor."[1] For a man of Colonel Roosevelt's caliber and prestige, it seemed a waste of his

[1] Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 426

splendid powers. In spite of these heroic endeavors, Davenport later suffered a humiliating defeat. The Progressive party was approaching its end.

When the news of the "Hinman deal" first reached Beveridge, he was touring the state of Illinois for Robins. With Medill McCormick and other Illinois leaders, he was receiving a most enthusiastic welcome everywhere. The effect of the news from New York was disheartening. "From that hour on," he wrote later, "the local committees on the Illinois tour who met the train looked like men who had been stricken with illness."

Beveridge was very angry and wrote Perkins: "I am very, very sorry that the Colonel's statement about Hinman and the New York situation made an exceedingly unfavorable impression on our workers in Illinois, and, I fear, on the general public. There is some danger that it may stop scores and hundreds of thousands of Republicans from coming over to us, who are ready to come and anxious to come, provided they think that the Progressive Party is here to stay --- The Colonel's statement may give this important class an unfavorable opinion on this subject ---. So it is not very nice, is it, after all the work we have done out here in Indiana - yes, Illinois and Ohio too -- and the sacrifices we have made, to have this bombshell thrown into us? The Republican papers and politicans, and the 'Indianapolis News' are making the most of it. They are printing columns about T.R.'s abandonment of the Progressive Party."[1]

Wherever Beveridge travelled thereafter in Indiana, he was confronted by huge bill board advertisements of the

[1] Bowers, C.G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 451,452

Republicans: 'Eventually, why not now?' With the handicap of Roosevelt's attempted merger of the Progressives with the Republicans, his own struggle for the senatorship of Indiana became more difficult and his correspondence with Perkins became increasingly more bitter. When the latter asked him to make speeches in Maine, he refused. "We have got to win the Indiana fight and are going to win it", he wrote. "The New York performance has made our work harder, but not impossible ---. I shall expect Colonel Roosevelt, in order to make up in a very small way for the large handicap his action has placed upon me out here, to assist in the campaign by the delivery of a few speeches in my behalf." In New York, Roosevelt had said to Shaffer, "if we can elect Beveridge in Indiana, we can nominate him for the presidency in 1916." In preparation for these speeches he had written Beveridge asking for a complete record of his public work. But his actual efforts amounted to only one-half a day in Indiana, two in Ohio, three in Illinois and one week in Pennsylvania. (Here two of his intimate friends were running for office, - Gifford Pinchot for United States Senator and William Draper Lewis for Governor.)

Nevertheless wherever Roosevelt did journey, he was greeted with the same old time enthusiasm, but he knew perfectly well that this was only for him and not at all for those for whom he was asking the crowds to vote. Yet motivated by a desire to discharge all political obligations to his friends, he went through the entire campaign, receiving the applause of the

vast audiences, always cheerful, always with his head high, and with all his old time appearance of confidence and hopefulness, while inwardly he saw the utter futility of it all. A few of the leaders at Progressive headquarters, realizing the accuracy of his judgment, begged him to stop the wearisome campaigning, but he kept on persistently, for whether or not Beveridge and other friends looked upon his labors in the same light that he did, Roosevelt at least felt that he was obviating all obligations. Finally on the last campaign trip, as he was nearing New York on the way to Sagamore, in the company of Secretary O.K. Davis, he leaned over and whacked Davis on the knee, saying as he did so: "Well, O.K., I've got only a few hours more of this campaign, and then I shall be through. I'll be out of politics then for good and all and I'll be a free man. I shall have paid every political obligation that I owe to anybody anywhere. I have done a great deal of foolish and useless work this fall, but after all, it has been worth while from one point of view. It has paid all my debts. Hereafter no man can claim anything from me in politics. Not a single obligation is left. I have done everything, this fall, that everybody has wanted. This election makes me an absolutely free man. Thereafter I am going to say and do just what I damn please."[1]

[1] Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 443

Chapter VII

The results of the election of 1914 showed a slight victory for the Democrats. They managed to carry a number of former Republican states, such as Massachusetts, Michigan, and Nebraska, and to increase their majority in the Senate by two, but their House majority fell from 147 to only 29. They were saved from disaster only because the opposition was still divided. The Democratic loss resulted in benefit to the Republicans chiefly, for they carried many of their former strongholds, and also New York. The total Progressive vote fell from over 4,000,000 to about 1,800,000, less than half that in 1912. Their representation in the House was reduced from fifteen to seven members. The party failed to carry a single state except California, where Hiram Johnson was re-elected by a plurality of 130,000. Though a large vote was also polled in Pennsylvania, the results of the election, taken as a whole, showed that the Progressive Party was doomed. One of the National Committee, referring to its decease, wrote; "The Progressive Party died, intestate, with the campaign of 1914. It had little or nothing to devise, practically all of its assets having been appropriated, during its brief life time, by one or the other or both of the old parties."[1] Some of the newspapers also began writing sympathetic obituaries of the party, even extending their remarks to include the political career of the founder of the party. Roosevelt's own comment on the election expressed his

[1] Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 443

belief that "the Progressive party cannot in all probability make another fight as a national party; and, if it does, there will be no expectation that I will have to lead."[1]

The disaster to the Progressive Party was due to a variety of causes, - among which may be mentioned the dissensions within the party and the return of many of its followers to the Republican fold. Others, attracted by the record of Democratic achievements, supported President Wilson because they were convinced that the Progressive party was gradually fading away. The radical proposals of the Progressives may have been less favorably received than previously, because the country was in a more cautious mood. The outbreak of war in Europe in August had alarmed many in the United States and had made them fearful of any change whatsoever. They had lost their "desire for innovation and experimentation because a large part of the world had burst into flames and the remaining part was thinking of its fire-extinguishers."

The shrinkage of Democratic votes from 1912 to 1914 was probably due to the traditional custom of holding the party in power responsible for business conditions. During the winter of 1913-14, an industrial depression was settling down on the country: business was dull in many lines and an increasing number of men were out of work. During the spring and summer conditions grew slightly worse. Political opponents of the administration were not slow in attributing the hard times to the Democratic tariff and general Democratic incompetence.

[1] Bishop,J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, II:356

Immediately after the election, Mr. George W. Perkins called a conference of Progressive leaders at Chicago (1914). He had not thought it wise to have Roosevelt present and had written Beveridge to that effect. A blunt and decisive answer was received, asking why the founder and leader of the party should not attend the conference when the very life of the party was at stake. In the hour of defeat, leadership was more indispensable to the troops than in the flush of victory. If ever there was a time for Roosevelt to rise above any height to which he had previously risen, that was the hour. The rank and file of the party and the local county and district leaders expected and depended on a sturdy and aggressive leadership.[1] But Roosevelt did not attend, and Beveridge had departed for Europe as war correspondent for Collier's Weekly.

There were, however, ninety-one representatives from thirty-four different states in attendance. They issued a statement vigorously denying the demise of the Progressive party and denouncing their intention of keeping up their organization and campaign of education with the view of being a serious factor in the election of 1916. The unanimous opinion was that there could be no reconciliation with the Republican party under any circumstances. Almost everybody was for a renewal of the fight all along the line.

Newspaper comments varied according to their friendliness to the Progressive movement but some admitted that the party was still alive and might yet become a force to be reckoned

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 453-454

with. A new party could not expect to win immediately and their million and a quarter votes might make them a decisive factor in 1916. Even if the separate party organization was not continued, their support of President Wilson would insure him of a second term while if the Republicans should nominate a superior candidate, he might get the bulk of the Progressive vote. So conjecture at the close of 1914 ranged all the way from the expectation of an increase in party strength to the prophesy of party dissolution, with the votes going either to the Republicans or to the Democratic administration.

Chapter VIII

One factor which was to prove a decisive influence in the next presidential election was just beginning to loom large upon the political horizon at this time. This was the war in Europe. Although the people of the United States were shocked by the ruthless invasion of Belgium, yet no voice of protest was raised in this country in August 1914, and apparently there was no expectation of intervention by the United States among the Allies. Ambassador Page, who himself a few months later insisted that the United States ought to sever relations with Germany, wrote to Colonel House from London on August 28th, 1914, of the gain to United States in being able to escape the brutalization of war, and Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Ambassador to the United States, told House on September 12, "I hope and believe that at any rate one part of the world will keep out of it."[1]

Even as the German armies were pressing toward Paris through Belgium, President Wilson issued his Proclamation of Neutrality (August 4th), and two weeks later asked his fellow countrymen to be "impartial in thought as well as in action." This insistence upon strict neutrality and the maintenance of peace was entirely consistent with his character and his policies for the government, as well as with the law of nations. He was by nature a real pacifist and believed that war was not only debasing morally but disastrous economically. Perhaps

[1] Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, I:286

there was also a constitutional tendency to postpone a decision upon a question in which he saw a balance of opposing arguments. With his scholarly temperament he set the good over against the evil so carefully and theoretically that it was hard to determine upon a course of positive action, and so he delayed an unpleasant decision, hoping that something might "turn up." Furthermore he had entered office with a certain program of social reform in view, and until this was completed, it was essential that there be an atmosphere of domestic tranquillity.

President Wilson took the position that it was better to "reserve judgment until the end of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in their entirety and in their true relations."[1] He urged his fellow countrymen not to be thrown off their balance by a war with which they had nothing to do and whose causes could not touch the United States. He felt that it might afford the United States an opportunity for disinterested service. Undoubtedly he looked forward to acting as mediator in the struggle just as Roosevelt had done between Russia and Japan.

In 1915, President Wilson began first to be criticized harshly for not having adopted a more positive policy as a signatory to the Hague Convention. His critics said that the United States should have protested against the German invasion of Belgium and the President should have made it plain that this country sympathized with the Allies. But such criticism at a later time disregards altogether the fact that public

[1] Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, II:51

there was also a constitutional tendency to postpone a decision upon a question in which he saw a balance of opposing arguments. With his scholarly temperament he set the good over against the evil so carefully and theoretically that it was hard to determine upon a course of positive action, and so he delayed an unpleasant decision, hoping that something might "turn up." Furthermore he had entered office with a certain program of social reform in view, and until this was completed, it was essential that there be an atmosphere of domestic tranquillity.

President Wilson took the position that it was better to "reserve judgment until the end of the war, when all the events and circumstances can be seen in their entirety and in their true relations."[1] He urged his fellow countrymen not to be thrown off their balance by a war with which they had nothing to do and whose causes could not touch the United States. He felt that it might afford the United States an opportunity for disinterested service. Undoubtedly he looked forward to acting as mediator in the struggle just as Roosevelt had done between Russia and Japan.

In 1915, President Wilson began first to be criticized heavily for not having adopted a more positive policy as a signatory to the Hague Convention. His critics said that the United States should have protested against the German invasion of Belgium and the President should have made it plain that this country sympathized with the Allies. But such criticism at a later time disregards altogether the fact that public

[1] Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, II:91

opinion was not then crystallized to this degree, and expressions of sympathy were contrary to neutrality and inconsistent unless they were to be supported by action. Few people in the entire country believed then that the United States would ever enter the war. So the President's proclamation of neutrality was generally accepted as right, and occasioned no real comment. The attitude of Roosevelt, who later became one of the most determined advocates of American intervention on the side of the Entente, was that of loyal support of the President in his policy of neutrality. He congratulated the country on its separation from European quarrels, and emphasized the value of the Monroe Doctrine. Apparently he did not condemn publicly the invasion of Belgium, for in the Outlook of August 22nd 1914, he said, "I am not now taking sides one way or the other as concerns the violation or disregard of those treaties. When giants are engaged in a death wrestle, as they reel to and fro they are certain to trample on whoever gets in the way of either of the huge straining combatants."

When the Belgium Commission visited the United States a month later, Roosevelt wrote that the invasion had been inevitable because "disaster would surely have attended her (German) arms had she not followed the course which she actually did follow as regards her opponents on her Western frontier." There could be "nothing but praise due a stern, virile, and masterful people, a people entitled to hearty respect for their patriotism and far-seeing devotion." This was the voice of the

militarist in Roosevelt which had spoken, not the idealist and moralist. He said that Germany admitted that as "a matter of abstract right and wrong" the invasion of Belgium could not be justified, but "when a great nation is struggling for its existence," there was "no such thing as abstract right and wrong." Roosevelt's comment on such reasoning was an admission that "almost all great nations have - again and again acted in accordance with such a plea."[1]

Thus did Roosevelt seem to condone not only the invasion of Belgium on the ground of military necessity, but he also refused to pass judgment on the Antwerp air raids or the destruction of Louvain. Was he then pro-German in the early stages of the war? Some of his critics have maintained that he was, pointing to an article in the Outlook of September 23rd in which he referred with pride to the German blood in his veins, and asserted that either side in the war could be defended. While expressing sympathy for Belgium he felt that, 'we had not the slightest responsibility for what had befallen her, and probably nothing that we could have done would have helped her. Our first duty was to protect our own interests, and maintain our neutrality by refusing to do anything to aid unoffending, weak powers which were dragged into the gulf of bloodshed and misery through no fault of their own.'

Some of these articles, Roosevelt later regretted and altered before he permitted their publication in final form. His change in point of view was probably typical of large

[1] Pringle, H.F., Theodore Roosevelt, 579-580

militarist in Roosevelt which had spoken, not the idealist and moralist. He said that Germany admitted that as "a matter of abstract right and wrong" the invasion of Belgium could not be justified, but "when a great nation is struggling for its existence," there was "no such thing as abstract right and wrong." Roosevelt's comment on such reasoning was an admission that "almost all great nations have - again and again acted in accordance with such a plea."

Thus did Roosevelt seem to condone not only the invasion of Belgium on the ground of military necessity, but he also refused to pass judgment on the Antwerp air raids or the destruction of Louvain. Was he then pro-German in the early stages of the war? Some of his critics have maintained that he was, pointing to an article in the Outlook of September 23rd in which he referred with pride to the German blood in his veins, and asserted that either side in the war could be defended. While expressing sympathy for Belgium he felt that, 'we had not the slightest responsibility for what had befallen her, and probably nothing that we could have done would have helped her. Our first duty was to protect our own interests, and maintain our neutrality by refusing to do anything to aid unoffending, weak powers which were dragged into the gulf of bloodshed and misery through no fault of their own.'

Some of these articles, Roosevelt later regretted and altered before he permitted their publication in final form. His change in point of view was probably typical of large

numbers of other Americans who were at first indifferent as to the outcome but in the course of a few months became ardent opponents of Germany. Two of his biographers, Mr. Joseph Bishop and William Draper Lewis resent the insinuation that Roosevelt was favorable to Germany in the first few months of the war. The latter asserts that the Colonel was anxious to do nothing which would in any way embarrass the President so he wrote only a part of what was in his mind. In conference with the other editors of the Outlook, however, he voiced his belief that the United States should have protested the invasion of Belgium because of the fact that it was in contravention of the Hague Treaty.[1] Mr. Lawrence F. Abbott, one of the editors of the Outlook, vouches for this testimony. At the Republican State Convention in New York City a year and a half later, Elihu Root took occasion to criticize the President because he did not send a stern protest to Germany when Belgium was first invaded. At the Democratic Convention a few days later, ex-Governor Glynn retaliated by attacking Roosevelt who had become the chief Republican critic of the Administration. Glynn produced the Outlook of September 23, 1914, and read extracts from Roosevelt's article, seeking to prove that obviously Roosevelt himself had not favored the idea of protesting against the invasion of Belgium.

His official biographer, Bishop, believes that Roosevelt's private letters were more truly representative of his opinion than was the article in the Outlook. But many of these letters

[1] Lewis, William D., The Life of Theodore Roosevelt, 459-460.

numbers of other Americans who were at first indifferent as to the outcome but in the course of a few months became ardent opponents of Germany. Two of his biographers, Dr. Joseph Bishop and William Draper Lewis resent the insinuation that Roosevelt was favorable to Germany in the first few months of the war. The latter asserts that the Colonel was anxious to do nothing which would in any way embarrass the President so he wrote only a part of what was in his mind. In conference with the other editors of the Outlook, however, he voiced his belief that the United States should have protested the invasion of Belgium because of the fact that it was in contravention of the Hague Treaty. Mr. Lawrence F. Abbott, one of the editors of the Outlook, vouches for this testimony. At the Republican State Convention in New York City a year and a half later, Elihu Root took occasion to criticize the President because he did not send a stern protest to Germany when Belgium was first invaded. At the Democratic Convention a few days later, ex-Governor Glynn retaliated by attacking Roosevelt who had become the chief Republican critic of the Administration. Glynn produced the Outlook of September 23, 1914, and read extracts from Roosevelt's article, seeking to prove that obviously Roosevelt himself had not favored the idea of protesting against the invasion of Belgium.

His official biographer, Bishop, believes that Roosevelt's private letters were more truly representative of his opinion than was the article in the Outlook. But many of these letters

---

1 Lewis, William D., The Life of Theodore Roosevelt, 459-460.

have not been made public. The correspondence with Senator Henry Cabot Lodge ceases on May 23, 1914, and is not resumed again until December 7, 1914.[1] The first letter after the war began, which Bishop publishes is dated October 3, 1914 and was written to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Ambassador in Washington. In it Roosevelt stated that if he had been President, he should have acted on the thirtieth or thirty-first of July (war was declared July 28th) as head of a signatory power of The Hague Treaties. He would have called attention to the guarantee of Belgium's neutrality and stated that the treaties imposed a serious obligation which he expected not only the United States but all other neutral nations to join in enforcing. He would not have made such a statement unless he had been willing to back it up and he believed the American people would have followed him. As it was, he felt certain that the majority were then following Wilson, for in such a crisis few people make up their minds for themselves but tend, or ought to tend, to support the President.[2]

Two days later (October 5, 1914) Roosevelt wrote Baldwin in London that in his opinion in regard to Belgium "all the right was on her side and all the wrong was committed against her." He felt that England could not have done other than she did, in interfering for her. Another personal letter on November 8, 1914 (to Charles McCarthy, Madison, Wisconsin) expressed his admiration for the men of German descent in the United States but added that if the United States really

1 Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, II:447

2 Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, II:372

believed in world righteousness, then it was inexcusable for her not to protest against Germany's action in regard to Belgium.[1]

Thus from these private letters of Roosevelt's, it is apparent that he was reversing his policy of strict neutrality or partial defense of Germany to one of partisanship for the Allies. He gave no public expression to this however, until the early part of the year 1915, for as he wrote Rudyard Kipling (January 16, 1915) he did not like to bother the men who were at the helm so he kept silent as long as he thought there was any chance that Wilson was really developing a worthy policy. But when he came to the conclusion that the President really had no policy whatever, he felt that someone should speak frankly to his fellow countrymen and that he was endeavoring to do. By February 1915 he was "sick at heart over the actions of Wilson and Bryan." That month Germany announced her submarine policy.

Now to what is Roosevelt's changing viewpoint to be attributed? A gradual change in public opinion was taking place and it was apparent that complete neutrality could be only a temporary condition. The increasing concern in the war was due to a variety of causes. England, France and Russia published selections from the diplomatic correspondence which had taken place with Germany and Austria during the interval between the murder of the Archduke of Austria (June 28th) and the declaration of war by Austria on Servia (July28th). The main point of these documents, garbled though they may be, centered on the efforts to bring about a conciliation between Austria and Servia, which

[1] Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, II:373-374

had been frustrated by a determination on the part of the Teutonic powers to have war. Many in the United States who read these accounts drew the conclusion that Germany could have restrained Austria but chose not to do so. To such, Germany then became the brutal aggressor and the perpetrator of horrible atrocities which were described in the daily newspapers. The resulting change in public opinion is reflected in the change which had taken place in Roosevelt's point of view also.

A second influence which increased his partiality for the cause of the Allies was his growing dislike for Woodrow Wilson. How long this had been smoldering before it burst into flame is difficult to decide. It probably began after his return from South America, in May 1914, when he learned of the treaty which Secretary of State Bryan was negotiating with Colombia whereby the United States was to apologize for its part in the secession of Panama and was to grant an indemnity of $25,000,000. This "blackmail treaty", as Roosevelt termed it, reflected upon the integrity of his course in 1903 in what he considered one of the greatest acts of his entire administration. It made little difference to him that the Senate persistently refused to uphold President Wilson in this matter. He felt so indignant that on July 11, 1914, he retired as associate editor of the Outlook because he could no longer support the administration in international relations, since this meant "the abandonment of the interest and honor of America."

The animosity toward Wilson was apparent in spite of the

reform measures which had been enacted before the close of the year 1914. These included the passage of an income tax, a lower tariff, currency reform and increased control of the trusts. Since most of this legislation had been recommended in the platform of the Progressives, it might have been expected that some word of approbation would have been expressed by Roosevelt, but he was silent.

A further intangible cause of his dislike for Wilson was the difference in their conception of the Presidency. Roosevelt believed that the president should take the lead in guiding public opinion in certain channels while Wilson would make no move in a given course until he was certain that (or at least it seemed so to Roosevelt) public opinion demanded it and would support him whole heartedly. So Roosevelt fretted and raged to see Wilson wait for the entire nation to demand participation in the war. In an interview given in 1915 to Julian Street, he discussed the peculiar psychology of the American people. Under smooth and eloquent leadership, they could be induced to put aside the thing they knew they ought to do and satisfy their national conscience with the soft words of the leader. But if given direct and forceful leadership they would rise with enthusiasm and eagerness to do the thing they knew was right.[1]

After the German announcement of her policy of submarine warfare against all enemy vessels encountered in the "war zone" about the British Isles, (February 1915) a wave of apprehension swept over the United States, for if this policy were carried

[1] Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 446

reform measures which had been enacted before the close of the year 1914. These included the passage of an income tax, a lower tariff, currency reform and increased control of the trusts. Since most of this legislation had been recommended in the platform of the Progressives, it might have been expected that some word of approbation would have been expressed by Roosevelt, but he was silent.

A further intangible cause of his dislike for Wilson was the difference in their conception of the Presidency. Roosevelt believed that the president should take the lead in guiding public opinion in certain channels while Wilson would make no move in a given course until he was certain that (or at least it seemed so to Roosevelt) public opinion demanded it and would support him wholeheartedly. So Roosevelt fretted and raged to see Wilson wait for the entire nation to demand participation in the war. In an interview given in 1918 to Julian Street, he denounced the peculiar psychology of the American people. Under smooth and eloquent leadership, they could be induced to put aside the thing they knew they ought to do and satisfy their national conscience with the soft words of the leader. But if given direct and forceful leadership they would rise with enthusiasm and eagerness to do the thing they knew was right.

After the German announcement of her policy of submarine warfare against all enemy vessels encountered in the "war zone" about the British Isles, (February 1915) a wave of apprehension swept over the United States, for if this policy were carried

---

Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 446

into effect it would mean not only the destruction of property of neutrals, but also the possible drowning of American citizens, even women and children. The excuse given by Germany was the British blockade upon foodstuffs which had been declared as a result of the control of food in Germany by the Government. The United States promptly warned the German government that the proposed measure violated international law, and that should any harm result to American ships or citizens, Germany would be held to "a strict accountability." In reply, Germany insisted that it was necessary to meet the British naval policy with "sharp counter-measures" and that the Imperial government would not be responsible for "any unfortunate accidents." This evasive reply left the citizens of the United States in grave doubt as to whether Germany would heed in any degree the President's warning - and if she did not, would Wilson lead the nation into war?

The answer to this question was not long delayed, for on the afternoon of May 7th 1915, the Lusitania, the pride of the British merchant marine, was torpedoed by a German submarine off the southeast coast of Ireland and sank in half an hour. In all, 1,198 persons lost their lives including 114 American citizens. A cry of horror and anguish went up from the United States which was followed by a swift demand for punishment and retribution. This was especially pronounced throughout the eastern half of the country, but less noticeable in the Far West. The German Ambassador, Count Von Bernstorff, who had

warned the public in the newspaper not to sail on the Lusitania presented to Secretary of State Bryan, the formal condolences of the German Emperor, but placing responsibility for the disaster on the British government which "through its plan of starving the civilian population of Germany, has forced Germany to resort to retaliatory measures."

A few days later President Wilson delivered an address to a body of newly naturalized citizens in Convention Hall, Philadelphia, in the course of which he made a remark which amazed and perplexed the country. With no reference to the Lusitania he said, "There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that is is right." Separated from its context, where he had referred to the consecration of United States to ideals that could not be carried into effect through force, unless other methods had failed, its meaning was quite different when taken alone. It sounded as if the United States would not resort to force to uphold its right, and Americans felt humiliated. Germany grew more arrogant: the Allies more contemptuous.

The question has often been raised whether President Wilson should have broken off at once with Germany diplomatic relations. What support would he have received in such an event? He himself believed, whether rightly or not, that the country did not then desire war with Germany. Sir Cecil Spring Rice felt that the President was right. He told Sir Edward Grey that the

"great mass of people here are deeply anxious not to be involved and that Wilson, on a visit to New York City, had been received with "a greater degree of popularity than has been given to anyone since Roosevelt."[1] The President himself by temperament was not inclined to listen to the vehement demands for intervention, for he knew that they were based on emotion, rather than on deliberate judgment. Ex-President Taft favored cool consideration and careful action. The pro-German element and the pacifists were opposed to any positive threat of intervention. The former believed that the British blockade justified Germany's submarine warfare: the latter were afraid even of strong language in diplomatic notes, lest it lead to war.

Roosevelt was highly indignant at the outrage and felt that he could no longer be loyal to the administration for it meant "disloyalty to our self-interest." He had for some months been advocating a more vigorous policy toward Germany. Although doubtless aware of British propaganda, he wised first to expose German intrigue among those hyphenated Americans who, while enjoying the benefits of American citizenship "conspire against the United States and do their utmost to promote the success of Germany and to weaken the defense of this nation." Then he considered it essential that this country be aroused to prepare for war if we should be drawn into it. He highly approved the plan of General Leonard Wood to organize a camp for volunteers at Plattsburg. President Wilson would not, however, officially endorse any preparation which might be considered by the

[1] Pringle, Henry F., Theodore Roosevelt, 583

"great mass of people here are deeply anxious not to be involved and that Wilson, on a visit to New York City, had been received with "a greater degree of popularity than has been given to anyone since Roosevelt."[1] The President himself by temperament was not inclined to listen to the vehement demands for intervention, for he knew that they were based on emotion, rather than on deliberate judgment. Ex-President Taft favored cool consideration and careful action. The pro-German element and the pacifists were opposed to any positive threat of intervention. The former believed that the British blockade justified Germany's submarine warfare: the latter were afraid even of strong language in diplomatic notes, lest it lead to war.

Roosevelt was highly indignant at the outrage and felt that he could no longer be loyal to the administration for it meant "disloyalty to our self-interest." He had for some months been advocating a more vigorous policy toward Germany. Although doubtless aware of British propaganda, he wised first to expose German intrigue among those bynaturated Americans who, while enjoying the benefits of American citizenship "conspire against the United States and do their utmost to promote the success of Germany and to weaken the defense of this nation." Then he considered it essential that this country be aroused to prepare for war if we should be drawn into it. He highly approved the plan of General Leonard Wood to organize a camp for volunteers at Plattsburg. President Wilson would not, however, officially endorse any preparation which might be considered by the

[1] Pringle, Henry F., Theodore Roosevelt, 388

Germans as an unfriendly act. Most important of all, Roosevelt labored unceasingly to arouse the spirit of the people to a more vigorous defense of their rights. "I do not believe", he said, "that the firm assertion of our rights means war, but in any event, it is well to remember that there are things worse than war."[1]

The news of the sinking of the Lusitania reached Roosevelt towards the close of the libel suit which had been brought against him by William Barnes Jr. of New York. During Roosevelt's support of Harvey D. Hinman, the Progressive candidate for the Governor of New York in 1914, he had charged that Barnes, the Republican boss in that state, had an alliance with Boss Murphy of Tammany Hall in the interest of corrupt politics. Barnes was then forced to reply to this if his power was to continue. The next day, July 23, 1914, he brought suit for libel. The case came to trial in Syracuse on April 19, 1915 and continued till May 22nd.

Mr. Barnes' counsel, Mr. William M. Ivins, believed that he could produce evidence that would drive Roosevelt forever from political life, and many of the Colonel's enemies hoped he would succeed. So confident was the chief counsel of the outcome of the trial that he went about telling his acquaintances that he had Roosevelt's doom in his hands. On the night before the trial he said to Elihu Root, "I am going to Syracuse tomorrow to nail Roosevelt's hide to the fence." "Ivins," answered Root, "let me give you a piece of advice. I know Roosevelt

[1] Pringle, Henry F., Theodore Roosevelt, 583

[1] Pringle, Henry F., Theodore Roosevelt, 555

and you want to be very sure that it is Roosevelt's hide that you get on the fence."[1]

Roosevelt's political record for thirty years was subjected to the closest scrutiny, and letters, interviews, and speeches were searched for evidence to prove that he had been guilty of political methods similar to those with which he had charged Barnes. Roosevelt was a very self-confident witness and made speeches and orations until halted by the Court. He dominated the court room and was complete master of himself and of the proceedings. The newspapers published full reports of the trial and were read with intensest interest by the whole country. Long before the case went to the jury, the public had decided that there was not a scrap of evidence to reflect upon President Roosevelt's political integrity but that his criticism of Barnes was absolutely truthful. The latter was also denounced for giving Roosevelt such a fine opportunity to vindicate himself for, as one critic said, "Of all the blundering lunatics I have ever known, Barnes is the worst. Here we had Roosevelt, after his candidacy against Taft, dead and buried politically. We were rid of him for all time. Now Barnes has not only opened the door for him to come back, but he has pushed him through to the front of the stage and made him a greater popular idol than ever."[2]

When the evidence was all in and the case was ready to go to the jury, the first news of the sinking of the Lusitania arrived. What connection would any comment that Roosevelt might

[1] Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, II:366

[2] Ibid, 367

make have upon the outcome of the law suit in view of the fact that there were two or possibly three men of German birth upon the jury? Roosevelt had previously been so outspoken that he had antagonized many German-American citizens. Would any further denunciations cause him to lose the law suit, involving the defense of his reputation and perhaps heavy damages?

During the night of May 7th - 8th, he was aroused by his host, Mr. Horace Wilkinson, who told him that a newspaper reporter had more complete details of the disaster to relate and would like a statement from him. After hearing of the extent of the tragedy, Roosevelt immediately denounced it as murder and piracy, only on a vaster scale than old time pirates ever practised. He felt that the United States could not refrain from taking action, for her own self respect demanded it. Almost immediately he gave out to the press advance copies of an editorial which was to appear in the Metropolitan Magazine, with which he was now connected, entitled "Murder on the High Seas." Greatly to Roosevelt's surprise, however, the jury returned a verdict in his favor in spite of these utterances.

The next few months stirred Roosevelt's soul to its depths for he felt that the President should hold Germany to "strict accountability" and then, if ever, was the time for action, not words. But the President was then beginning his long diplomatic struggle with Germany at the end of which he acknowledged himself to Colonel House (September 1915) "My chief puzzle is to determine when patience ceases to be a virtue." Roosevelt

felt that the country was sinking to depths of ignominy, and resented keenly the President's "adroitness in phrase making when he had no intention of putting deeds behind the phrases." He gave vent to his pent up indignation in a series of magazine articles on "Fear God and Take Your Own Part", "America First", "Dual Nationality", "Preparedness", "A Phrase or a Fact". He thought Wilson had become "the popular pacifist hero" supported by "the professional pacifists, the flub-dubs and the molly-coddles." When Bryan, in protest over the sending of the second Lusitania note to Germany, resigned as Secretary of State, Roosevelt was sure that the President was going to adopt a sterner attitude until he discovered that the point at issue between the President and his Secretary was "merely the proper point of dilution of tepid milk and water."[1]

So the year 1915 drew to a close with Roosevelt in open opposition to the President's war policy, with only a limited preparedness program being adopted, and a campaign of sabotage instigated by German sympathizers and Mexicans. What then was the result of all of this on the Progressive Party? First it was bringing forward wholly different party issues. Domestic questions were submerged in the depth of the foreign crisis. Roosevelt had taken up the new issues of preparedness, opposition to pacifism and a militant 100% Americanism, not from any partisan viewpoint but yet to a degree that caused many, such as Miss Jane Addams, David Starr Jordan and others to drop quietly out of the Progressive ranks. Furthermore his opposition

[1] Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, II:380

to the President's war policy was really restoring him to the leadership of the Republican party. Even those who condemned his course most bitterly in 1912 now began looking to him for the aggressive leadership which they did not find in the White House. He became the spokesman on all questions relating to the war and the conduct of the administration, perhaps because no one else ventured to speak so freely and so courageously. This continued until the campaign of 1916 which was really a referendum on the leadership of Wilson and Roosevelt, with foreign policies as the main issue of the campaign.

The Progressive leaders, like Beveridge, realized the new respect which was accorded Roosevelt in the Republican party and felt that unless he came out soon with a tremendous bugle blast calling the Progressives to arms, he wouldn't have anybody to call to arms - or to put it in terms of politics, he wouldn't have anybody to deliver.'[1] The New York Progressives practically dominated a conference of party leaders, which was held in New York in July 1915 and secured the adoption of a resolution authorizing the party in each state to take its own course locally. Beveridge considered this the same thing as dissolving the party and going over to the enemy without terms either as to platform or candidates. Thus releasing each state to do as it liked was not only dissolving the party and throwing away all its assets, but it did not even have the dignity of self respect. When the New York Progressives were considering a return to the Republican Party, Roosevelt expressed his

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 485

appreciation of their previous support, gave them his blessing, but added that if his advice were asked he would advise Progressives to stay with the party.

It was this same group of New York Progressives who proposed that the Progressive Convention should be held at the same time and in the same city as the Republican. The reason for this strategy was perfectly apparent. Beveridge felt that it would place the Progressive party in a ridiculous light and that the Progressives, if in earnest, ought to meet before the Republicans.

On December 17, 1915, a gathering of influential Republicans was held at the home of Judge Gary of the United States Steel Corporation, at 856 Fifth Avenue, New York. Colonel Roosevelt was there, also Mr. George Perkins, and August Belmont, Jacob H. Schiff, George F. Baker, A. Barton Hepburn, Frank A. Vanderlip, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Daniel Guggenheim, Clarence Mackay and George Cortelyou. When the press found out about it, Judge Gary explained that it was given to discuss preparedness. But men like Beveridge with practical knowledge of politics, never doubted afterwards that Roosevelt would seek the Republican nomination in 1916.[1]

[1] Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 487

Chapter IX

By agreement between the two national committees the national conventions of both parties assembled in Chicago on the same day (June 7, 1916) in the hope that the two parties might unite upon a single candidate and platform, and thus defeat the Democratic nominee. They met in separate halls but carried on extended negotiations, with a view to healing the schism of 1912. Each convention opened with a calculating gaze upon the other, both manoeuvring for the advantage in the choice of the candidate. The uncertainty centered about Roosevelt, whether the Republicans would accept him as the fusion candidate, and if not, what he and the Progressives would do.

From the Progressive Convention an invitation was sent to the Republicans for the appointment of joint committees for conference, and this was promptly accepted. The Republicans chose Senator Smoot of Utah, Senator Crane of Massachusetts, Senator Borah of Idaho, President Butter of Columbia and A.R. Johnson of Ohio. The Progressives selected Governor Johnson of California, George W. Perkins of New York, Horace B. Wilkinson of New York, John M. Parker of Louisiana, and Charles J. Bonaparte of Maryland. They conferred in a spirit of good will, but as the Progressives were convinced that Roosevelt was the one man on whom the two parties could unite logically, with any hope of success, and as Senator Smoot bluntly announced that his party would accept any one but Roosevelt, no common agreement

could be reached. Their report was then carried back to each convention, but the Republicans took no notice of it. Again the committee went to work, the Republicans proposing as a compromise candidate Mr. Charles Evans Hughes. But this time the Progressives would have none of it. They were there to nominate their own beloved leader, and they intended to do it.

Why was the Republican Convention so opposed to the acceptance of Roosevelt as the fusion candidate? Was it due to a sincere belief that they could not win under his leadership? It was perhaps the Republican leaders, rather than the rank and file, who were opposed to his nomination, and they still bore resentment because of his action in 1912. Their sole idea seemed to be that the convention should nominate a "regular Republican." They apparently feared that the delegates might get out of hand, and if so, lead a stampede to Roosevelt. So they proceeded in a cautious and subdued manner, determined not to accept him but they were not united on anyone else. Another consideration which may have influenced some Republicans was the antagonism of the German vote and the Irish and the pacifist vote which he had aroused by his outspoken criticism.

Were not the Republican leaders, in refusing the olive branch of reconciliation held out to them by the Progressives, really preparing the way for their own defeat? If Roosevelt had decided to head the Progressive ticket again, could they have won in spite of the third party? This was the bluff which the Progressive leaders hoped to carry through successfully and

thus force the nomination of their beloved leader on the Republicans. But these negotiations failed, and with them all hope of the Progressives died, for the Old Guard were too wary to be caught by such strategy. They were confident that Roosevelt was through with every kind of personal politics, and that he had not the slightest intention of accepting the nomination of a third party which had dwindled to simply a party of protest. Unless he could have the nomination of the two parties which would practically insure his election, he would not consider the candidacy. This opinion was not mere guess work, for apparently the Republican leaders had this information from sources so close to Roosevelt that it was indisputable.

Among the other candidates considered in the Republican convention was Elihu Root of New York, Theodore E. Burton of Ohio, Albert B. Cummins of Iowa, John W. Weeks of Massachusetts, and Charles E. Hughes of New York, then a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The leaders would have preferred Root but he probably could not carry the West; Cummins had been regarded as a radical in the East since his attack on the Payne-Aldrich Tariff in 1909. They had no desire for Hughes but there were certain considerations in his favor; he had had no part in the factional struggle of 1912, his record as former Governor of New York was progressive and ought to appeal to the West, and as a Justice of the Supreme Court, he had not antagonized any of the hyphenated American groups. So with little show of enthusiasm he was nominated on the third ballot.

The vice-presidential nomination went to Fairbanks, who had held that office during the second Roosevelt administration.

The platform of the Republican party was brief, matter of fact, and conventional. It gave a vivid description of horrors and outrages in Mexico and denounced Wilson's "indefensible methods of interference" in the internal affairs of that country: it pledged aid in the restoration of order, with adequate protection of American interests. The party favored neutrality in the European war and charged that the Wilson administration had resorted to "phrase-making and shiftly expedients," which had destroyed our influence abroad. Preparedness was emphasized, although in rather vague terms. The Underwood Tariff was declared a failure because of the decline in revenue and because the cost of living had not been curbed. The general stand of the platform was reactionary; does this indicate that the party convention was likewise?

There was apparently little change in the Republican party since 1912. They had revised none of their professed principles, and had not by a single act or declaration betrayed a leaning towards liberalism. Though the Old Guard were not so obviously in control of the 1916 convention, yet they were all there, Lodge, Cannon, Penrose, Smoot, Crane and the rest; in fact the party had not dismissed any of its objectionable leaders. They had refused to consider Roosevelt because they knew from experience that the bosses could not rule while he was in office. Hughes they did not like much better but they accepted him

reluctantly. Their attitude towards the Progressive overtures of reconciliation was evidence of the reactionary control of the convention. When the Progressives suggested a conference committee, they appointed one, but the very character of the men chosen, such as Smoot or Crane, made co-operation with the Progressives almost impossible. Having appointed a committee and received its report, they then proceeded to ignore it with studied indifference. Mr. William Dana Orcutt, a life long Republican and the biographer of Senator Burrows of Michigan, attended every session of this convention, hoping to see a recognition that the party was in sympathy with the trend of the time. But at the close of the convention he was convinced that the leaders were dead to their opportunities and either blind or indifferent to the demands of the people. The party had its chance to return to power, under better and cleaner auspices than at any time since its early days, when Roosevelt patriotically declined the Progressive nomination in 1916 and the Progressive Party yielded to the demand for a mutual victory. It had been the intention of the Republican leaders so to unite, he believed, but as the campaign progressed, they thought that they could elect their candidate without the assistance of the Progressives and thus keep the patronage of the party entirely within their own hands.[1] This was the final example of selfishness which received its just rebuke in the election of 1916.

The delegates to the Progressive Convention had the same

[1] Orcutt, W.D., Burrows of Michigan, II:322-324

earnest enthusiasm and loyalty that had characterized the gathering in 1912. When Raymond Robins, the temporary chairman, first mentioned the name of Theodore Roosevelt, there was a demonstration that lasted an hour and a half. It was with the greatest difficulty that they could be restrained from placing his name in nomination at once, even before a conference committee could consult with the Republican party. When it was evident that both parties could not agree upon him as a compromise candidate, Roosevelt wrote the convention urging that they both unite on Henry Cabot Lodge.

The amazement of the Progressives was almost overwhelming. No one present will ever forget the white tense faces of the leaders on the platform when this was being read, or the dismay, - for it came as a total surprise. It seemed to the delegates like a betrayal, - a spurning of their love and loyalty. Lodge could never have been nominated, for he was the antithesis of Progressive ideals. He had always hated the Bull Moose movement, although personally a friend of its founder.

Mr. Bainbridge Colby then placed the name of Roosevelt before the convention and Hiram Johnson seconded the nomination and called upon the Colonel to meet his responsibilities. John M. Parker, a former Democrat of Louisiana was named as Vice President. In a few hours Roosevelt's reply was received declining the nomination pending a conference with Hughes. It was positively cold-blooded in its tone, with not a note of comradeship for the loyal men and women who adored him and had

followed him for four years. The comments of Progressive leaders expressed their disappointment. Beveridge wrote to one of his friend, "I think that history has not one single example of a party or movement which was used so cold-bloodedly and wrecked so cyncially and selfishly as the Progressive Party has been used and wrecked."[1]

What then were Roosevelt's real motive in declining the nomination of the party which he had been instrumental in forming only four years previously? He would not permit any factional fight to be made for his nomination by the Republican Party because it would be a mistake to nominate him unless the country was ready to follow him in the campaign of preparedness and militant Americanism. For a year and a half Roosevelt had been a bitter critic of the administration considering Wilson the worst president since Buchanan. His defeat was essential to national honor and defense. If by alluring the Progressives back into the Republican fold, Roosevelt could accomplish this, was not the sacrifice of party to be preferred to that of country?

Although Roosevelt did not particularly like Hughes, he accepted his policies, and labored to secure his election, in order to defeat President Wilson. Hughes himself did not prove a particularly strong candidate, for his speeches seemed lacking in the very qualities of vigor and militancy which he was advocating. He was vague and indefinite, and relied upon attacks on the administration rather than on a constructive,

[1] Bowers, C.G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 490

positive foreign policy. Roosevelt was in direct contrast to Hughes in all these respects, and although his personal invective may have lost Hughes a few votes, yet his efforts were welcomed by the Republican party throughout the campaign.

The decisive factor in the final vote would be the extent to which Roosevelt could induce the Progressives to support the Republican candidate. Could he 'deliver' the party as a whole or would some turn to Wilson? Among the leaders there was no unanimity of opinion. Mr. Bainbridge Colby who derided the idea that the Republican Party of 1916 had reformed itself since 1912, announced that he would support Wilson. He thought Hughes' speech of acceptance made only perfunctory references to Progressive principles and was without any real sympathy with the movement. Many of the rank and file of the Progressives agreed with him, especially in the West. Of the two candidates, Hughes and Wilson, these westerners considered Wilson the more truly progressive and the more positive in his foreign policy. They gave him Kansas and California, which with better campaign strategy might have been won for the Republicans.

Other Progressive leaders adopted a different attitude and agreed to follow the recommendation of the Progressive National Committee which met in Chicago, June 26th to fill the vacancy caused by Colonel Roosevelt's declination. After an all-day fight in the Committee, thirty-two of the members agreed to place Hughes' name at the head of their ticket: nine members did not vote and six declined to go with the majority, and

turned later to the support of Wilson. Colonel Parker led the fight against the merger. He had labored to build up Progressive sentiment and defeat the traditional one party attitude of the south. Having met with some measure of success, and having burned all his political bridges behind him, he refused to withdraw as candidate for Vice President, and went through the entire campaign as a Progressive.

On the same day that the action of the Progressive National Committee was made public, Roosevelt came out with a personal statement which was really the obituary of the Progressive Party. He paid high compliment to his fellow partisans, but intimated that the Progressives had already rendered all the service they could to the country as an independent party and that the chief duty at present was to rescue the nation from the peril of another four years of Democratic administration which he thought the worst administration since Buchanan's time. Under the circumstances they should not sulk because he rejected their nomination, but should face the situation good humoredly and with common sense considering the highest interest of the American people.[1] The majority of the Progressive leaders accepted this and announced their endorsement of Hughes. Beveridge liked Hughes personally, but it was not until after a lengthy conference with him that he was willing to make a public announcement of his return to the Republican Party. Beveridge had worked so devotedly for four years for the building up of a truly progressive party that it was with considerable

[1] The Independent, July 10, 1916

disillusionment that he again campaigned for a Republican nominee.

After Hughes had accepted the endorsement of the Progressives, several conferences were had with him by leaders of the Progressive movement. They wanted to inform him of all the situations where any soreness still lingered because of the 1912 fight. In the campaign trip which had been planned for him to the Pacific Coast, he would visit California where for six years Governor Johnson had annually defeated the Old Guard. He was warned that Johnson was the strongest political leader in the entire state. It was suggested that one man from the party organization of Republicans and one from the Progressives accompany Hughes on this trip to give him information and also to see that both sides were represented on the committees and delegations which received him. Had this practical suggestion been accepted, the outcome of the election might have been very different.[1]

Hughes went west without much idea of the dissatisfaction on both Progressive and Republican sides. When he reached California he found an unusual situation. Governor Johnson was running in the Republican primaries for the nomination of United States Senator and was also endeavoring to support Hughes. He urged his old following to support the Republican candidate because he was really a Progressive. But Hughes proceeded to align himself with the machine which Johnson had beaten every year for six years. As if that were not enough,

[1] Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication, 452

he publicly greeted the leader of this defeated faction as "California's favorite son." The Old Guard cleverly prevented his even meeting Governor Johnson. California wondered if he could be influenced to such a degree by this weak faction, what he would do when he came up against the strong Old Guard in the Senate. It was manifestly impossible for Governor Johnson to do any more to help Hughes carry the state, and although he won the senatorship by over 300,000 votes, Hughes lost the state by only a few thousand.

The Democratic Convention, which met at St. Louis on June 14th was marked by a spirit of harmony and enthusiasm. President Wilson and Vice President Marshall were renominated by acclamation. The platform enumerated the legislative achievements of the preceding three years and challenged a comparison of their record with that of any party at any other time. The Chairman, Senator Ollie James, of Kentucky, pointed with pride to two amendments added to the Federal Constitution in 1913, - the one to tax the wealth of the country through the income tax, the other to free the Senate from the control of the great interests by making it elective by the people.

Not content with its record of achievement the platform declared for still other reforms, which were identical with the Progressive platform of 1912. This was undoubtedly a bid for Progressive support, which the Republicans were also seeking. Such measures as the Federal Reserve Act, the inheritance tax, the rural credits bill, the child labor bill and the workman's

compensation act were especially pleasing to the Progressives.

The platform praised the diplomatic victories of the President in his dealings with the belligerent countries of Europe and his refusal to intervene in Mexico. It advocated increases in the army and a reserve of trained soldiers.

The campaign did not turn upon domestic issues, however, nor the record of the Democratic party, but rather upon the approval of the President's foreign policy. The real question before the voters was whether in view of world conditions, Wilson or Hughes would make the better president. Wilson had the advantage of being in power, so that he could "make the news." He had a foreign policy which was known to the voters and was thoroughly familiar with the complicated questions which had arisen in the preceding four years so that his supporters could strongly urge the danger of "changing horses while crossing a stream." The Democrats freely admitted that relations with Mexico were still unsatisfactory but they argued that a firmer policy would have meant war at a time when the European situation was especially critical. The President's patience in dealing with Germany was also praised and the slogan "He kept us out of the war" undoubtedly won thousands of votes, especially in the states where women balloted. Senator James in the Democratic convention declared that "without orphaning a single American mother, or shedding a drop of blood, Woodrow Wilson wrung from the most militant spirit that ever brooded over a battlefield a recognition of American rights and an agreement to

American demands."

In the North East the trend of public opinion was decidedly against the President. His friendly attitude toward labor unions aroused the distrust of capitalists: business men disliked his policies and complained that those who surrounded him were incapable, especially some in his cabinet. His foreign policy toward Mexico and Germany was unsatisfactory. His early opposition to preparedness and the half hearted measures he finally did adopt were much criticized by the Republican campaign orators. But when the President countered by demanding of his opponent what he would have done differently regarding Mexico and Germany, Hughes was decidedly vague. He would not commit himself to an immediate declaration of war against either, for his party managers were anxious not to offend foreign-born voters. Whatever chance the Democrats might have in the election lay in the personal strength of Wilson with the masses, especially in the South and west of the Mississippi where the Progressive spirit was strong. Here he was regarded as the greatest Democrat since Jackson.

The election proved to be one of the closest and most unique contests in our history, and several days elapsed before the result was definitely known. The early returns from eastern and some middle western states seemed to indicate a victory for Hughes, but the results from the far West were unexpectedly favorable to the President. In several states the vote was so close that a recount was necessary. Finally it was evident that

the outcome hinged on the votes of California and Minnesota, either of which would turn the scale. The Minnesota recount still gave Hughes twelve electoral votes on a popular plurality of only 396. California's thirteen electoral votes finally went to the Democrats by a narrow margin and this gave the election to Wilson. Of the total number of electoral votes (531) a majority of 266 are required to elect. Hughes received 254, Wilson 277. More than eighteen and a half million voters, almost one-fourth of them women, expressed their choice at the polls. The popular vote was: Wilson 9,128,837; Hughes 8,536,380. Parker, running on the Progressive ticket for the vice-presidency, with no candidate for the presidency, received 42,836 votes.

Aside from the closeness of the contest the outcome was remarkable in several respects. Each candidate received a larger popular vote than had ever before been cast, that of Wilson being two million larger than any other Democratic candidate in the history of the country. Wilson won without New York or any of the other large eastern states, finding his support in the South and Far West. Hughes carried the East and Middle West. In all the important industrial communities except Ohio he was victorious, while the rural and agricultural regions supported the President. The Democrats were saved from complete defeat only by their gains in the farming states which were usually Republican. The people here regarded the President as a real Progressive and they liked his pacific foreign

policy. Possibly the high prices of their farm products and the degree of prosperity hitherto unparallelled may have been a factor in their choice.

The President everywhere proved stronger than his party, for the Democratic majority in the Senate fell from sixteen to ten. In the House the Democrats failed to retain control, electing 214 members as did the Republicans. The balance of power fell to a very few independents. In the states the honors were about even.

What did the election prove about the Progressive party? What became of the two million votes which they polled in 1914? First Hughes had not been successful in reconciling the Progressives as he had hoped to do. In most states he ran far behind the local Republican candidates. This does not necessarily imply that he was a weak candidate or that any other man would have made a better showing. It probably indicates that the Progressives were not willing to go back into the Republican party which seemed to them to be dominated by reactionaries. So they either voted for Wilson or remained away from the polls. It is estimated that from a third to a half of their number may have supported Wilson. The Republican-Progressive breach of 1912 had not been healed though the Progressives as a party virtually disappeared before the election.

Chapter X

The Progressive Party was one of the shortest-lived political organizations in the history of the United States. Created in the year 1912 out of the elements of the Progressive movement, it polled 4,000,000 votes in that year. Four years later, it ceased its corporate existence, and expired. What were the reasons for the disappearance of such a vigorous and flourishing party?

First it must be acknowledged that it was a one-man party. This was not so apparent at the time as in retrospective reflection. Whatever motives may have influenced its founder, - whether thwarted ambition or the protest towards reactionary methods of presidential nominations or the desire to unite all the liberal elements in the country for the attainment of a program of social and economic justice, Theodore Roosevelt was the motivating power of the Progressive Party. No explanation of party decline can be considered apart from him. Just as he called the party into existence, so he held within his control the power of its life and death during the critical years of 1913-1916, and by his acquiescence its sudden end came.

After the election of 1912, Roosevelt seemed to have lost interest in the party, although he retained a nominal connection with it until the campaign of 1916. By temperament and training he was an idealist and a reformer, but his judgment as a practical politician was never obscured. When the party was

defeated in 1912, he failed to see much promise for it in the future. While others dreamed of building gradually upon the foundation, which was then laid, he was ready to abandon the effort. When a friend called at Sagamore Hill soon after 1912, and talked of victory in 1916, Roosevelt's reply was, "I thought you were a better politician. The fight is over. We are beaten. There is only one thing to do and that is to go back to the Republican Party You can't hold a party like the Progressive Party together --- there are no loaves and fishes."[1]

Perhaps he discounted the tremendous hold which he had upon the affection and loyalty of his followers and perhaps also he minimized the tenacity with which the idealists would cling to the aspirations which the party expressed. Roosevelt never seemed to appreciate fully the type of a reformer who would stand alone, if need be, for a cause: with him there must be some actual measure of success attained or the effort must be abandoned. (Perhaps this is why LaFollette and Roosevelt, while seeking to promote a common cause never really were affiliated in spirit.) So Roosevelt was not interested in the continuance of the Progressive Party if it were to become only a minority party of protest.

The popular feeling among the Progressives was that their leader had deserted them in the hour of battle, but some have asserted that the opposite was true, that the rank and file had deserted their general, pointing in support of this view to the loss of over 2,000,000 votes from 1912 to 1914. But if the

[1] Pringle, Henry F., Theodore Roosevelt, 571

general sounds no bugle blast and orders no forward charge, is it strange if his troops desert? Perhaps his failure to do so was due to the fact that he felt that the people had grown tired of his leadership and that when a leader's day is past the greatest service he can render is to step aside and leave the ground clear for a successor. Such views may have been expressed in dejection of spirit, but on several occasions he voiced his opinion that the people as a whole were heartily tired of him and his views.

If the Progressive Party, which had polled more votes in 1912 than the Republicans, had succeeded in continuing this increase, there would have been a chance for it to become one of the two great parties of the country. The political tradition of the United States had seemed to show that voters prefer two parties only. Third parties have always been short-lived and full of trouble. Roosevelt expressed this view when he wrote, "Finally we have to deal with certain political habits that have become very deep-rooted in our people. The average man is a Democrat or a Republican and he is this as a matter of faith, not as a matter of morals. -- He has grown to accept as co-relative to this attitude entire willingness to punish his party by voting for the opposite party. Having done this, he returns to his own party. -- Then, there is the perfectly proper feeling that there is only room for two parties, the party in power and the party in opposition. We were in the position of the Free Soil party, not of the early Republican Party."

Roosevelt continues to state his views on still another factor in the party defeat of 1914: "Finally, in this election the fundamental question that interested the average man was the purely economic question of how he could best shape conditions so that he could earn his own living. The workingman was not interested in social or industrial justice." Neither was the materialist, who lacked the vision to see beyond the beaten path in which he was accustomed to travel. The platform of 1912 may have also been for the average man, too advanced along the lines of loftiness of aim and high aspirations for social and economic progress.[1]

At the opposite extreme were the visionary well meaning reformers who gloried in such lofty aims; some of them were cranks who "tended to go into sheer lunacy." Roosevelt believed that the majority of the practical idealists of the country were with him, but he also felt hampered by the lack of practical politicians, although he praised the upright disinterested service of his good, fine lieutenants.

In strong opposition to the Progressive Party were certain groups whose influence was felt increasingly as time went by. Both the old political organizations were able to exert a tremendous power because they controlled ninety-nine percent at the very least of the corporate wealth of the country, and therefore the great majority of the newspapers. The Socialists also fought as bitterly as did the representatives of the two old parties, for the Progressives stood equally against

[1] Bishop, J.B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, II:354-358

government by a plutocracy and government by a mob. In addition to these groups were other citizens who realized the need of reform but feared that radicals were getting control of the new party and were seeking to overthrow constitutional limitations by such policies as initiative, referendum, and recall of judicial decisions.

If the Democrats had chosen a candidate of reactionary tendencies in 1912 and in 1916, the prospect of success for the Progressive Party would have increased proportionately, but the measures achieved by President Wilson in that interval made a tremendous appeal to the Progressives of the middle West, and they proved to be the decisive factor in the election of 1916.

When the World War began in 1914, the Progressive Party put their emphasis on new issues to the neglect of the old. Preparedness and militant Americanism were emphasized, rather than domestic problems. This type of propaganda alienated some Progressives while undoubtedly it attracted other followers. Consequently with the substitution of new issues for the old, the most that remained for the originators of the party was an intense personal devotion to their leader. When he refused to be their standard bearer again, logically the alternative was dissolution of the party. There are many who feel that in the choice that Roosevelt made at this time he reached the heights of self-sacrificing patriotism. He consented to the elimination of the party he founded because it had become a dangerous derelict in the path of political progress. He believed it

might have again wrecked the chances of success for the party which seemed at that time most likely to prepare the country adequately to meet the peril of a foreign foe. In comparison with that danger, the fortune of a political party sank out of sight.

Chapter XI

In considering the results of the Progressive party, the most apparent was the change of party in 1912 when the Democrats under Woodrow Wilson came into power and became under his leadership an aggressive force for reform. In 1916 it brought about the nomination of Charles E. Hughes by the Republicans, who were compelled to yield to public opinion in the choice of their candidate. But of far greater moment for the future was the momentum given by the Progressives to the movement for reform. It did not originate these reforms but it fairly loosened the public mind to a range of ideas which had long struggled for a hearing. The majority of the planks of the party platform of 1912 have since become incorporated in those of the two large parties, and to a large extent have since been enacted in state or national legislation. Measures of social and industrial reform have been passed, while woman suffrage, direct election of senators by the people, the initiative, referendum and direct primaries for presidential nomination have given to the people a larger measure of control over the government. In the National Convention of the Republicans held at Kansas City in 1928, Robert LaFollette, Jr., made the statement that thirty-two of the thirty-five planks first offered by his father in 1908 have since been made law. Though given as a personal tribute to his father, it may also eulogize the progressive reformers of these years.

Chapter XI

In this great movement for reform the Progressives had taken a worthy part. They had focused the clear, direct rays of public opinion upon much needed reforms of political and industrial life. They had initiated measures of social and economic justice and had sought to restore to the people a more direct control over the government. They had advocated ideals of civic righteousness and social betterment which, to whatever extent they have been accomplished, either through the instrumentality of the Progressive Party alone or through another, have brought to thousands new opportunities for "the pursuit of happiness."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I

Primary Sources

Bishop, Joseph B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time.(Two Volumes)

Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1920

Butt, Archibald W., Taft and Roosevelt. (Two Volumes)

Doubleday, Doran and Company New York 1930

Butt, Archibald W., The Letters of

Doubleday, Page and Company New York 1924

Davis, Oscar K., Released for Publication.

Houghton Mifflin Company Boston 1925

LaFollette, Robert M., LaFollette's Autobiography; a Personal Narrative of Political Experience.

The Robert M. LaFollette Company, Madison, Wisconsin 1911

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. 1884-1918 Vol. II

Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1925

Robinson, Corrine Roosevelt, My Brother Theodore Roosevelt.

Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1921

Roosevelt, Theodore, An Autobiography.

Macmillan Company New York 1913

Roosevelt, Theodore, The New Nationalism.

The Outlook Company New York 1910

Seymour, Charles, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.

Houghton Mifflin Boston 1926

Wilson, Woodrow, The New Freedom.

Doubleday, Page and Company New York 1913

II

Secondary Sources

Bowers, Claude, G., Beveridge and The Progressive Era.

Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston 1932

Chamberlain, John, Farewell to Reform; Being a History of the Rise, Life and Decay Of The Progressive Mind in America.

Liveright Company New York 1932

Charnwood, Lord, Theodore Roosevelt.

The Atlantic Monthly Press Boston 1923

Croly, Herbert, Progressive Democracy.

Macmillan Company New York 1915

DeWitt, Benjamin Parke, The Progressive Movement.

Macmillan Company New York 1915

Duffy, Herbert S., William Howard Taft.

Minton Balch Company New York 1930

Duncan - Clark, Samuel J., The Progressive Movement.

Small, Maynard and Company Boston 1913

Gilman, Bradley Roosevelt The Happy Warrior.

Little Brown and Company Boston 1921

Haworth, Paul L., The United States In Our Own Times. 1865-1920

Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1920

Haynes, Fred E., Social Politics in the United States.

Houghton Mifflin Boston 1924

Haynes, Fred E., Third Party Movements Since the Civil War.

The State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 1916

Howland, Harold, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times.

Yale University Press New Haven 1921

Kohlsaat, Herman H., From McKinley to Harding.

Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1923

Lewis, William Draper, The Life of Theodore Roosevelt.

The John C. Winston Company Chicago 1919

McCaleb, Walter F., Theodore Roosevelt.

Albert and Charles Boni New York 1931

Ogg, Frederic Austin, National Progress. 1907 - 1917.

Harper Brothers New York 1918

Orcutt, William D., — Burrows of Michigan and The Republican Party. Vol. II

Longmans, Green and Company New York 1917

Pringle, Henry F., — Theodore Roosevelt.

Harcourt, Brace and Company New York 1931

Rhodes, James Ford, — The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations. 1897 - 1909.

Macmillan Company New York 1923

Seymour, Charles, — Woodrow Wilson And The World War.

Yale University Press New Haven 1921.

Stephenson, Nathaniel W., — Nelson W. Aldrich, A Leader in American Politics.

Charles Scribner's Sons New York 1930

Thayer, William Roscoe, — Theodore Roosevelt, An Intimate Biography.

Grosset & Dunlap New York 1919

Washburn, Charles G., — Theodore Roosevelt, The Logic Of His Career.

Houghton Mifflin Company Boston 1916

Wister, Owen, — The Story of A Friendship 1880-1919.

Macmillan Company New York 1930

III

Newspapers and Magazines

Collier's Weekly
52:5 Jan. 24 '14
52:5 " 31 '14
57:5 Jl. 1 '16
57:7 Ap. 15 '16
57:15 Jl. 8 '16

Current Opinion	60:381	Jl. '16
	51:3	Ag. '16
The Independent	85:109	Ja. 24 '16
	86:231	My. 15 '16
	86:428	Je. 12 '16
	87:120	Jl. 24 '16
	87:50	Jl. 10 '16
	87:4	Jl. 3 '16
The Literary Digest	45:2	Jl. 6 '12
	45:244	Ag. 17 '12
	45:403	S. 14 '12
	45:1005	N. 30 '12
	45:1161	D. 21 '12
	46:166	Ja. 25 '13
	46:695	Mr. 29 '13
	46:1210	May 31 '13
	48:1422	Je. 13 '14
	49:219	Ag. 8 '14
	49:1106	Dec. 5 '14
	51:384	Ag. 21 '15
	52:160	Ja. 22 '16
	53:1392	N. 25 '16
The Nation	98:176	F. 19 '14
	99:367	S. 24 '14
	100:266	M. 11 '15
	102:687	Je. 15 '16
	103:411	N. 2 '16
New York Sun	August 2, 1909	
The New York Times	June 26, 1910	
	August 26, 1910	
	April 26, 1912	
The New York World	May 5, 1909	
	November 5, 1910	
The New Republic	1:6	Ja. 16 '15
	6:227	Ap. 1 '15
	7:159	Je. 17 '16
	8:180	S. 23 '16
	9:330	Ja. 20 '17
The North American	203:807	Je. '16

Current Opinion	60:381	Jl. '16
	51:3	Ag. '16
The Independent	85:109	Ja. 24 '16
	86:231	My. 15 '16
	86:426	Je. 12 '16
	87:120	Jl. 24 '16
	87:50	Jl. 10 '16
	87:4	Jl. 3 '16
The Literary Digest	45:2	Jl. 6 '12
	45:244	Ag. 17 '12
	45:403	S. 14 '12
	45:1005	N. 30 '12
	46:1161	D. 21 '12
	46:166	Ja. 25 '13
	46:595	Mr. 29 '13
	46:1210	May 31 '13
	48:1422	Je. 13 '14
	49:219	Ag. 8 '14
	49:1105	Dec. 5 '14
	51:384	Ag. 21 '15
	52:160	Ja. 22 '16
	53:1392	N. 25 '16
The Nation	98:176	F. 19 '14
	99:367	S. 24 '14
	100:266	M. 11 '15
	102:687	Je. 15 '16
	103:411	N. 2 '16
New York Sun	August 2, 1909	
The New York Times	June 26, 1910	
	August 26, 1910	
	April 26, 1912	
The New York World	May 5, 1909	
	November 5, 1910	
The New Republic	1:6	Ja. 16 '15
	6:227	Ap. 1 '15
	7:159	Je. 17 '16
	8:160	S. 23 '16
	9:330	Ja. 20 '17
The North American	203:807	Je. '16

The Outlook	101:470	Je. 29	'12
	101:810	Ag. 10	'12
	102:567	N. 16	'12
	102:830	D. 21	'12
	108:629	N. 18	'14
	112:118	Ja. 19	'16
	113:423	Je. 21	'16
	113:533	Jl. 5	'16
	113:881	Ag. 16	'16
	114:357	O. 18	'16
	114:783	D. 13	'16
The Review of Reviews	53:643	Je.	'16
	54:318	S.	'16
	54:547	N.	'16
The Survey	36:304	Je. 17	'16

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
1 1719 02555 7325